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"Questioning is an indispensable instrumentality of justice."
Justice Jackson, dissenting in
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 332 U.S.
143, 160 (1944).
Should the police, in the course of criminal
investigation, be entitled to interrogate an arrested
person in privacy, without permitting him to
communicate with a lawyer and prior to taking
him before a judicial officer for a preliminary
hearing? We would be hard put to explain to
visitors from a legal Mars how such secret ques-
tioning in a police station fits into a system of
criminal law which recognizes the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Never-
theless, such questioning is common police practice
in the United States. It is approved by leading
authorities on criminal investigation and defended
by responsible police administrators as necessary
to effective law enforcement.
Such questioning is strikingly unlike the way in
which a person accused of crime is treated in court.
In coutt, with few exceptions, proceedings are
public. In the police station, questioning is said
to be effective only if it is conducted in privacy.
In court, the defendant is entitled to the advice
and support of a lawyer as well as family and
friends. In the police station, the suspect is ordi-
narily not permitted to communicate with his
family or a lawyer until his interrogation has been
completed. In court, the defendant is entitled to
know the charge against him and be confronted
by adverse witnesses. In the police station, the
suspect may not be told what crime the police
think he has committed, and he is frequently not
charged with a crime until after he is questioned.
If the police decide that he is innocent, he may be
released without ever being charged with a crime.
In court, the accused is informed of his right to
counsel and right not to answer questions. In the
police station, the police will probably not mention
the subject of legal advice. Usually it is only after
the questioning is completed and an oral state-
ment is being reduced to writing that they will
warn the prisoner that he is not required to answer
their questions. In court, the defendant is presumed
innocent. In the police station, the interrogator
seeking a confession is likely to question a suspect
on the hypothesis that he is guilty although the
evidence is inconclusive. In court, an impartial
judge and loyal counsel will protect the accused
against badgering, questions based on false prem-
ises and other kinds of unfair cross-examination.
The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
entitles him to avoid the witness stand entirely. In
the~police station, the interrogators are the only
judges of what is proper questioning. They may
try to trick their subject into making incriminating
statements by falsely telling him that someone
else has confessed and implicated him or by pre-
tending to have physical evidence of his guilt. They
may press him repeatedly, accuse him of lying or
shout at him. They are likely to use the psycholo-
gical pressures of isolation, prolonged questioning
and various emotional appeals to encourage a
confession. Since they are subject to no immediate
supervision or disinterested observation, there is
the danger that they will go further and use threats,
deprive him of sleep or food or even use physical
force in order to obtain a desired statement.
Proceedings in court are dominated by an
insistence on procedural regularity. The conflict
of interest between the accused and the prosecution
is recognized and mediated by an impartial judge.
Although the same conflict is present in more acute
form in the police station, the suspect is left under
the unsupervised control of investigators who
naturally share the purposes and outlook of the
prosecutor.
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The law of police questioning, as we shall see,
is compounded of incompleteness and indirection.
It consists largely of rules about the admissibility
of confessions and the requirement that arrested
persons be promptly brought to court. Rather than
directly regulating police interrogation practices,
the law is vexed with the problem of providing
effective- remedies for the victims of improper
police questioning.
Secret questioning by the police has character-
istic aspects of illegality. Typically the suspect is
held in violation of the general requirement that.
arrested persons be promptly brought before a
judge, magistrate or commissioner. This postpones
a preliminary hearing at which a judicial officer
can advise the prisoner bf his rights and decide
whether there is enough evidence to justify holding
him to answer a formal charge. Delay for the
purpose of questioning encourages unlawful arrests
without probable cause in the hope that station
house interrogation will produce a confession or
other useful evidence. When the prisoner is ques-
tioned, his right to bail and the advice of counsel
are denied by the police for a period the length of
which lies in their discretion. His right to a speedy
trial is postponed. And if no one knows of the
arrest, his isolation has the effect of postponing
the right of habeas corpus.
It is also impossible to reconcile secret police
questioning with the right to counsel and the
privilege against self-incrimination. The right to
counsel stands to ensure that an accused person,
no matter what his economic position or degree
of sophistication, will understand his jeopardy and
be able to defend himself intelligently. In these
terms, it is hard to see any justification for post-
poning the right until after the period between
arrest and appearance in court. It is during this
period that a lawyer's advice is likely to have the
most meaning and effect. Similarly, it is difficult
to find a rationale for the privilege against self-
incrimination which does not apply to police
station questioning as well as examination in a
court room.1
'See BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCE-
MENT Or THE CRIMINAL LAW: RIOLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 86-107 (1955). The contrary argument is made
in 3 WiGuoRE, EVIDENCE §823 (3d ed. 1940). See also
McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
51 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 138, 151-52 (1960); Comment,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Does it Exist
in the Police Station?, 5 STAN. L. REv. 459 (1953);
MAYERS, SHALL WE AmaEND = Firm AmENDmENT?
82-100 (1959).
The secret questioning of arrested persons is
defended simply with the argument that it is
necessary to effective law enforcement. This view
seems to be accepted by the public and at times
by the courts. On the other hand, the argument
against such interrogation practices has too often
been rested on the danger of police brutality.
Emphasis on the 'third degree' has tended to
obscure a number of difficult issues raised by
pre-judicial police interrogation apart from the
problem of abuses.
This paper will focus on the private questioning
of persons in custody. It will not deal with the
problem of determining when an arrest has taken
place nor with interrogation prior to arrest. At
the outset, we will examine the types of inter-
rogation methods which are approved under profes-
sional police standards in the United -States
together with the argument that secret questioning
is necessary for effective law enforcement. Part
two will sketch the law of police questioning. The
third section of this paper will consider the factual
assumptions underlying the argument for secret
questioning, the problems of empirical research
and some relevant psychological and sociolog-
ical factors. Part four will treat three secondary
issues, the length of permissible interrogation,
when if at all the police should warn the prisoner
of his rights and the exclusionary rules of evidence
barring confessions obtained during unlawful police
detention. The concluding sections will discuss the
right to counsel in the police station and whether
any pre-judicial interrogation by the police should
be allowed.
I. RECommFNDED METHODS OF INTERROGATION
AND THE ARGUMENT FOR SECRET
QUESTIONING
It is playing Hamlet without the ghost to discuss
police questioning without knowing what such
questioning is really like. Terms such as "proper"
and "fair" questioning are too often used without
any explanation of what they mean in practice.
What is needed is not another account of third
degree horrors but an understanding of interroga-
tion procedures which are approved by professional
police standards in the United States. It is believed
that the following summary of interrogation
methods will give some content to the generalities
in which the subject is usually discussed and serve
as a preface to the ensuing discussion. It is based
upon Part II of the leading police manual by
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Professor Fred Inbau and John Reid, Lie Detection
and Criminal Interrogation (3d ed. 1953).
Interrogation Methods
The manual emphasizes the importance of
avoiding threats, promises and'abuses of any kind,
methods which render a resulting confession in-
voluntary or untrustworthy and "which no self-
respecting officer can conscientiously defend."
(p.. 215)
The problem is how to elicit desired information
from an untruthful subject. The recommended
principles and methods assume no special equip-
ment such as a lie detector. Instead, they are
presented primarily for the average interrogator
"who may be equipped with nothing more than
his own good common sense and a fair under-
standing of human nature." (142)
"The principal psychological factor contributing
to a successful interrogation is privacy .... [A]
suspect or witness is more apt to divulge his secret
in the privacy of a room occupied by only two
persons than in the presence of five, ten, or
twenty." (142) The interview should take place
in a quiet room with as few distractions and police
surroundings as possible.
"The less there is in the surroundings of an inter-
rogation room to remind a criminal offender,
suspect, witness, or other prospective informant
that he is in police custody or jail, or that the
penitentiary awaits, the more likely he is to make
a frank statement .... " (147) Thus it is suggested
that the room not have barred windows and noted
that one police department purposely arranged
its interrogation room with open windows so as
to invite escape into an adjoining yard with no
exit. It was found that once a guilty subject had
unsuccessfully attempted to escape he usually
confessed soon afterward.
Suspects may be classified into two groups, those
whose guilt is definite or reasonably certain, and
those whose guilt is doubtful or uncertain. The
first group may be further classified in terms of
the type of offense committed, the motivation and
the offender's reaction. There are "emotional
offenders ... who commit crimes in the heat of
passion, anger or revenge (e.g., assaults; killings;
rape, or other sex offenses; etc.), and also persons
whose offenses are of an accidental nature (e.g.,
the hit-run motorists)." (151) The emotional
offender usually has strong guilt feelings. Thus
"the most effective interrogation approach to use
on him is one based upon sympathetic considera-
tions." (151) But his urge to obtain relief by con-
fession is opposed by the desire to avoid the legal
consequences of his act. As time passes, and he is
allowed to feel that he can escape undetected, the
emotional offender may become less emotional and
more rational. Therefore, the interrogator should
not only sympathize with the offender and en-
courage the urge to confess, he should also persuade
that subject that his guilt has been detected and
that denials are useless. Thus it is effective for the
interrogator to "display an air of confidence in
the subject's guilt," to point out the circumstan-
tial evidence against him, and to call attention
to the physiological and psychological symptoms
of guilt. He must give no indication that he is
influenced by what the subject may say in behalf
of his innocence, even where the facts presented
may indicate innocence; it is better initially to
show no interest in exculpatory statements. By
leading th offender to believe that he is exhibiting
symptoms of guilt, his confidence in his ability
to deceiv& can be destroyed or diminished and
further resistance made to seem futile. Thus the
interrogator will call the subject's attention to
pulsation of the carotid artery in his neck, excessive
activity of his "Adam's apple," dryness of the
mouth, inability to look the interrogator "straight
in the eye" or exhibitions of restlessness by leg
swinging, hand tapping, foot wiggling and the
like. ".... [I]t is advisable to remind the subject
that he doesn't feel very good inside; and that this
'peculiar feeling' (as if 'all his insides were tied
in a knot') is the result of a troubled conscience.
While making this statement it is well for the
interrogator to touch or tap the subject's abdomen,
as though it were the repository for the conscience
to which the interrogator refers." (156) The sub-
ject who swears to his truthfulness, insists on his
spotless record or who answers "not that
I remember," can be told that in the interrogator's
experience these are characteristic signs of lying.
Being careful to avoid the legal prohibition
against promises of immunity or leniency as induce-
ments, the interrogator may obtain an incrimi-
nating statement by sympathizing with the sub-
ject and telling him "that anyone else under similar
conditions or circumstances might have committed
a similar offense." (157) The subject is allowed to
"save face" by the interrogator's assurances of
sympathy and understanding. Such solicitations
may "seem to cast a shadow over the subject's
1961]
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previously clear vision of the legal consequences
of an exposure of his guilt." (158) Particularly in
cases involving sex offenses, the offender will find
it easier to confess as his guilt feelings are reduced
by minimizing the moral seriousness of his offense.
The interrogator may thus emphasize that the
subject's sexual irregularity is not an unusual one,
that it occurs frequently even among so-called
normal or respectable persons, that the interrogator
has worked on cases involving much more offensive
experiences, or "that the interrogator himself has
been tempted to do, or almost or actually did do,
the very sort of thing of which the subject is
accused." (159) With the so-called "intellectual"
type of subject, it may be helpful to refer to the
Kiney reports.
Condemning the victim or an accomplice may
help the offender to justify the offense in his own
mind and make it easier for him to confess. A
rapist may be told that the victim was to blame
for her provocative behavior. With an embezzler
it may be helpful to condemn the employer for
paying inadequate salaries. If an accomplice is
blamed, or even government or society for allowing
conditions conducive to such crimes, the offender
may feel less responsible and find it easier to
confess.
It is frequently essential to express friendship in
urging the subject to tell the truth. Extending
sympathy "by such friendly gestures as a pat on
the shoulder or knee, or by a grip of a hand,"
telling the subject that "even if he were your own
brother (or father, sister, etc.) you would still
advise him to speak the truth," urging him to tell
the truth "for the sake of his own conscience,
mental relief, or moral well-being, as well as 'for
the sake of everybody concerned,' and also because
it is the only decent and honorable thing to do"
(164), are gestures that "may produce a flood of
tears along with the confession of guilt."
Compare the suggestion for "jolting" by
the author of a different manual. The inter-
rogator asks questions in a quiet almost soothing
manner. Then "... the investigator chooses a
propitious moment to shout a pertinent question
and appear as though he is beside himself with
rage. The subject may be unnerved to the extent
of confessing...."-2
Another tactic is the "friend and enemy act" in
which two interrogators alternate, one sympathetic
O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGA-
TION 108 (1956).
and the other unfriendly. The subject may be
thrown off balance and confess to the friendly
questioner to retaliate against the colleague playing
the "enemy" role. It is also useful in some cases to
invite the subject to admit to a partial lie by sug-
gesting that his victim may have exaggerated the
offense although the interrogator does not believe
this. If the subject accepts the invitation to make a
partial and less incriminating admission it becomes
more difficult for him to continue to resist, having
once acknowledged that he previously lied.
Some of the above methods are also applicable
to the questioning of "non-emotional" offenders.
Typical subjects of this type are "persons who
have committed crimes for mercenary gain (e.g.,
robbery, burglary, etc.), and particularly those
offenders who are repeaters or recidivists." (170)
However, such subjects "experience little or no
feeling of remorse, mental anguish, or compunction
as a result of their criminal acts" and are thus less
responsive to a sympathetic approach. Because
they have a more realistic attitude, they are
ordinarily more vulnerable to appeals to the logic
of their situation, that is, a showing that their
guilt.can be or is established by evidence inde-
pendent of their statements.
The questioner thus may point to the futility of
resistance or appeal to the suspect's pride by
flattery or a challenge to his honor. If efforts to
obtain a confession are unavailing, an admission
about another relatively minor offense may serve
as a "wedge" which will lead to incriminating
statements about the offense under investigation.
Where two or more persons participated in the
offense, a common technique is to play one against
the other by leading each to believe that his
accomplice has confessed and implicated him when
this is not the fact; a method which another manual
picturesquely calls "bluff on a split pair."3 Simi-
larly, theinterrogator may pretend to have physical
evidence which implicates the subject.
In interrogating suspects whose guilt is doubtful
or uncertain, the examiner usually must decide
whether to behave as though he believes the sub-
ject to be guilty or innocent or he may assume a
neutral position. The first approach has the advan-
tage of surprise and may "shock" the guilty sub-
ject into confession but it has the disadvantage of
putting the guilty subject on guard and it may
make an innocent subject too confused and excited
to give helpful information. The second approach
3 Id. at 106.
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solves the latter difficulty and may encourage a
guilty subject to "lower his guard" but makes it
more difficult for the examiner to press the sub-
ject about his possible guilt. The interrogator who
treats the subject .as innocent or who takes a
neutral attitude must determine whether he is
lying; if so, then for interrogation purposes the
subject may move into the category of those whose
guilt is definite, or reasonably certain, although
the experienced interrogator will know that an
innocent person sometimes will lie in order to
conceal an irrelevant indiscretion or circ um-
stance which he fears would invite suspicion.
The advice for handling a person who refuses
to answer questions is interesting. The examiner
should concede the sfibject's right to remain silent
but go on to point out the incriminating signifi-
cance of his refusal. Then the interrogator should
immediately ask some innocuous questions which
may gradually lead to questions about the offense
under investigation. The authors say,
"Except for the career criminal, there are very
few persons who will persist in their initial
refusal to talk after the interrogator has handled
the situation in this suggested manner." (187)
The basic principles of interrogation of suspects
and offenders are equally applicable to the ques-
tioning of witnesses or other prospective inform-
ants. A fearful witness should be assured of protec-
tion. A witness who refuses to cooperate in order
to protect the offender or because his attitude is
anti-police may be told that the offender has been
disloyal; thus a wife may be told that her husband
has been unfaithful.
"Ordinarily, however, some more effective meas-
ures are necessary. When all other methods
have failed, therefore, the interrogator should
accuse the subject of committing the crime (or
of being implicated in it in some way) and pro-
ceed to interrogate him as though he were in
fact considered to be the guilty individual. A
witness or other prospective informant, thus
faced with the possibility of a trial or conviction
for a crime he did not commit, will sooner or
later be impelled to abandon his efforts in the
offender's behalf or in support of his anti-social
or anti-police attitudes." (195)
The author of a different manual makes a
similar suggestion:
"Reverse Line-Up. This technique is applicable
in crimes which ordinarily run in series, such
as forgeries and muggings. The accused is placed
in a lineup, but this time he is identified by
several fictitious witnesses or victims who as-
sociated him with different offenses. It is ex-
pected that the subject will become desperate
and confess to the offense under investigation
in order to escape from the false accusations."'
The Inbau and Reid manual concludes with an
analysis of the law of confessions. There is an
extended discussion of the tests applied by the
United States Supreme Court to the admissibility
of confessions in state cases reviewed under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The treatment of the
"psychological coercion" cases concludes,
"... there is nothing inherently wrong about
a lengthy interrogation. It does appear, how-
ever, that during a lengthy interrogation time
must be taken out for eating, drinking, and rest.
As to just what is required will depend upon the
particular case. The interrogator will have to
exercise his own discretion as to what is reason-
able under the circumstances."(208)
Compare the advice about lengthy interroga-
tions in another police manual:
"....where emotional appeals and tricks are
employed to no avail [the investigator] must
rely on an oppressive atmosphere of dogged
persistence. He must interrogate steadily and
without relent, leaving the subject no prospect
of surcease; He must dominate his subject and
overwhelm him with his inexorable will to obtain
the truth. He should interrogate for a spell of
several hours pausing only for the subject's
necessities in acknowledgement of the need to
avoid a charge of duress that can be technically
substantiated. In a serious case, the interrogation
may continue for days, with the required inter-
vals for food and sleep, but with no respite
from the atmosphere of domination. It is pos-
sible in this way to induce the subject to talk
without resorting to duress or coercion. The
method should be used only when the guilt of
the subject appears highly probable." 5
Inbau and Reid point out 1) that the state courts
have generally rejected the rule of McNabb v.
United States6 and will not exclude a confession
obtained after failure to take a prisoner promptly
before a magistrate as required by statute, 2)
"the general rule that trickery and deception do
not nullify a confession, regardless of the possible
4 Ibid.
6Id. at 112.
6318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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objection to such practices from a strictly moral
viewpoint" (223) and 3) that except for the unusual
statutory requirements found in Texas and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, it is not neces-
sary to "warn an offender of his constitutional
rights before obtaining his confession." (223)
The Inbau and Reid manual is an authoritative
description of recommended interrogation tech-
ques. It appears to fairly reflect the substance and
flavor of professional police literature.7
The Argument for Secret Questioning
The position that secret questioning is necessary
for effective law enforcement has been summarized
by Professor Inbau in this way:
"1. Many criminal cases, even when investigated
by the best qualified police departments, are
capable of solution only by means of an admis-
sion or confession from the guilty individual or
upon the basis of information obtained from
the questioning of other criminal suspects.
"2. Criminal offenders, except, of course, those
caught in the commission of their crimes, ordi-
narily will not admit their guilt unless questioned
under conditions of privacy, and for a period of
perhaps several hours."8
He explains that the practical necessity for an
interrogation does not exist in all cases and that
ordinarily such questioning should not be the start
of an investigation. A thorough investigation
beforehand may turn up sufficient evidence to
make a confession unnecessary and in other cases
will help the interrogator obtain a confession and
provide evidence to substantiate it. Questioning
in privacy for "a reasonable period of time" is
7 See generally ARTa- & CAPuTo, INTERR.OGATION
FOR INVESTIGATORS (1959); K]nD, POLICE INTERROGA-
TION (1940); MUsBAN, INTERROGATION (1951); and
O'HARA, op. cit. supra note 2.8 Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and
Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 77, 80 (1957). See also
Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States
Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. Rxv. 442 (1948); INBAu &
REIn, LiE DETECTION AND CRaIBSNAx INTERROGATION
pt. II (3d ed. 1953), hereinafter cited as INBAU & REIm,
and Inbau, "Fair Play" in Criminal Investigations and
Prosecutions, 3 Nw. Univ. Tri-Quarterly No. 2, p. 3(1961). The summary of Professor Inbau's views in
the following pages is based upon these sources.
Consider also Professor Inbau's view of the privilege
against self-incrimination. It "exists mainly in order to
stimulate the police and prosecutor into a search for
the most dependable evidence procurable by their own
exertions; otherwise there probably would be an
incentive to rely solely upon the less dependable ad-
missions that might be obtained as a result of a com-
pulsory interrogation." INBAu, SELF-INCRIMINATION 6,(1950).
vital because self-condemnation is not normal
human behavior. Very few confessions are likely
to result from a "guilty conscience unprovoked by
an interrogation." The subject should not be
expected to divulge his secret unless he is ques-
tioned in privacy.
"For related psychological considerations, if an
interrogation is to be had at all, it must be one
based upon an unhurried interview, the neces-
sary length of which will in many instances
extend to se'reral hours, depending upon various
factors such as the nature of the case situation
and the personality of the suspect.... [P]sycho-
logical considerations .demand such secrecy.
Moreover, to insist that all confessions be the
result of 'reasoned choice' is to ignore the fact
that a great many criminal confessions represent
outbursts of emotion which one's reasoning
power would tend to suppress."
"Lack of privacy during a criminal interroga-
tion is comparable to a situation in which a
surgeon tries to perform a serious operation out
on a public street rather than in a properly
equipped operating room. Each one has about
an equal chance of a successful performance."
Professor Inbau argues that use of the inter-
rogation techniques described above is justified be-
cause:
1. Under the weight of authority in the United
States, these methods of questioning are legally
permissible.
2. Innocent persons are given sufficient protection
since none of the methods described "are -apt
to induce an innocent person to confess a crime
he did not commit," and the courts will not
tolerate any questioning practices which fail to
meet this standard.
3. These questioning practices can help to reduce
the use of physical abuses, threats and promises
by police officers who are "untrained and ill-
equipped to conduct proper and effective
interrogations."
4. Where serious crimes are involved which cannot
be solved by gathering objective evidence, inter-
rogation is necessary if the offenders are not to
go free. This justifies the interrogator in dealing
with "criminal offenders on a somewhat lower
moral plane than that upon which ethical,
law-abiding citizens are expected to conduct
their every day affairs," or, put somewhat
differently, "In dealing with criminal offenders,
and consequently also with criminal suspects
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who may actually be innocent, the interrogator
must of necessity employ less refined methods
than are considered appropriate for the transac-
tion of ordinary, everyday affairs by and be-
tween law abiding citizens."
Police opinion on the need for secret questioning
in criminal investigation appears to be unanimous.
Some of the strongest expressions of this view were
occasioned by the Supreme Court's McNabb and
Mallory decisions. 9 These rulings emphasized the
duty of federal officers to take arrested persons
before a committing officer without unnecessary
delay. These cases hold broadly that a confession
obtained by federal officers during an unlawful
delay may not be used as evidence in a federal
criminal trial. These decisions aroused sharp
criticism from police and prosecutors throughout
the country. Each was followed by unsuccessful
attempts at legislative reversal and congressional
hearings at which law enforcement officials insisted
that they could not function without the opportu-
nity to interrogate arrested persons prior to their
arraignment. 0
In 1943 hearings before a special subcommittee
of the House Judiciary Committee, Major Edward
J. Kelly, Superintendent of Police for the District
of Columbia, testified that "the ruling in the
McNabb case is one of the greatest handicaps that
has ever confronted law enforcement officers"
because it required that all arrested persons be
promptly arraigned and charged with a crime
without allowing the police an opportunity for
interrogation."
In 1957, Oliver Gasch, United States Attorney
for the District of Columbia, testified before a
'McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943);
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
" Admission of Evidence in Certain Cases: Hearings
Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 3690(1943), hereinafter referred to as the 1943 House
Committee Hearings; Supreme Court Decisions: Hear-
ings Before the Special Subcommittee to Study Decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., on the
decision in the case of Mallory v. United States, Part
1 (1957), hereinafter referred to as the 1957 House
Committee Hearings; Confessions and Police Detention:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), hereafter referred to as the
March 1958 Senate Committee Hearings and Admission
of Evidence (Mallory rule): Hearings Before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., on H.R.-11477, S.2970, S.3325
and S.3355 hereinafter referred to as the July 1958
Senate Committee Hearings.
"11943 House Committee Hearings at 1.
special subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee that the Mallory decision had created
an emergency situation requiring immediate
legislative action. He said,
"Without interrogation by the police of persons
reasonably believed to have committed a crime,
the police will be unable, in my judgment, to
solve many serious crimes with which they and
the community are confronted. ' 'n2
In the same hearings, Robert Murray, District of
Columbia Chief of Police, expressed the opinion
that if Mallory stood it would result in a "complete
breakdown in law enforcement in the District of
Columbia." He predicted that the decision would
also cause a "substantial rise in crime and a drastic
reduction in the solution of major criminal cases."'"
William H. Parker, Chief of Police of Los Angeles,
California, appearing for the legislative committee
of the International Association of Chiefs of Police
and, in his words, "to represent all local law en-
forcement in the United States" testified that
Mallory "would destroy modern law enforcement
as practiced and as preached today."'14
In 1958, the same note was sounded in hearings
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Police
Chief Murray said,
"... most of the murders, the rapes, and
robberies that I have come in contact with
would have gone unsolved and unpunished under
the Mallory decision.""5
Deputy Chief Scott said that Mallory had resulted
in an immediate increase in crime:
"Crime was reduced by this department by 35
per cent between 1953 and June 30, 1957. But
immediately after the Mallory decision it began
to rise in all categories, and, within 7 months had
risen enough to almost cover the gains we had
made in the first 6 months of 1957. Among these
cases which happened during this time were
street robberies, which rose about 20 per cent
during these 7 months, and the crime of assault
upon the victims of these robberies rose by 29
per cent.' 6
The police are not alone in the view that secret
questioning is a necessary law enforcement tool.
In an effort to overrule McNabb, the House of
121957 House Committee Hearings at 2. For Mr.
Gasch's views in 1960, see text at note 58 infra.
3 Id. at 34, 42.
14 Id. at 89.
"1 March 1958 Senate Committee Hearings at 124.
16 Id. at 133.
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Representatives passed the Hobbs Bill three
times." In the dosing minutes of the 85th Congress
an amended version of the similar Willis-Keating
Bill failed on a point of order in the Senate' 8 The
state courts have generally refused to adopt the
McNabb Rule. (In 1960, Michigan became the
first exception.19) The Uniform Arrest Act allows
brief detention without requiring that the person
held be produced before a magistrate.'0 Some
state statutes sanction a fixed period of delay
between arrest and arraignment.2 The same court
may hold detention for questioning illegal in a
false arrest suit but in ruling on the admissibility
of a confession describe a three-day incommunicado
detention as propern And some courts have
characterized "fair police questioning" as vital to
effective law enforcement.P Although these actions
do not represent a single position, each of them
appears to reflect some agreement with the assump-
tions underlying the argument for secret
questioning.
II. THE LAW OF POLICE QUESTIONING
Do the police have the power under existing
law to interrogate arrested persons in privacy for
"a reasonable time" which may extend to several
hours? Are the questioning practices described in
Part I of this paper lawful? These issues are best
discussed after a sketch of relevant legal principles.
The law in the United States which directly
defines the powers of the police in questioning
suspects and witnesses can be quickly stated. The
police have the undoubted right to ask questions
in the course of criminal investigation. However,
The legislative history of the Hobbs bill-is summar-
ized in Inbau, 43 I.. L. REv. 442, at 452, 453.18 The legislative history of the Willis-Keating bill
is summarized in Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory
Ride: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1,
38-46 (1958); See also Note, Prearraignment Interroga-
lion and the McNabb-Mallory Miasma, 68 YALE L.J.
1003, 1028-30 (1959).
'9 People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d
738 (1960). The cases are collected at 19 A.L.R.2d 1331(1951) and in IhBAu & Rxm at 208-10.
20 See Wainer, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. R.
315 (1942); Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or
Necessity in the Law of Arrest? 51 J. Cams. L., C. &
P.S. 402 (1960); Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest,
52 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 16 (1957); Wilson, Police Arrest
Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization,
51 J. Cpmd. L., C. & P.S. 395 (1960).
2 See Mo. STArs. ANNo., §544.170; R.I. GEN.
LAWS, §12-7-13; S.C. CODE §17.261.
n Compare Fulford v. O'Connor, 3 Ill.2d 490 (1954),
with People v. Kelly, 404 Ill. 281 (1949).
23 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958);
Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U. S. 504, 509 (1958).
unlike the courts, the police have no power to
compel testimony. This is sometimes confused with
the privilege against self-incrimination by refer-
ences to an individual's "constitutional right"
not to answer police questions. It is not unlawful
to refuse to answer police inquiries and to do so it
is not necessary to claim the privilege.
The real law of police questioning is found not
in these propositions but in the indirect restrictions
on pre-judicial interrogation imposed by the law
of confessions and the general requirement that
arrested persons be promptly produced in court.
The Fourteenth Amendment Confession Cases
The law of confessions determines when the
methods used by police to obtain an incriminating
statement render it inadmissible as evidence of
guilt. The traditional rule is that confessions must
be "voluntary"; if obtained by physical force,
threats or inducements, they may not be used in
court. Wigmore's is the classic argument that the
purpose of the rule is to exclude untrustworthy
evidence. 4 Dean McCormick pointed to features
of the rule indicating that it has the additional
purpose of discouraging improper police conduct.2
Since 1936, and the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Brown v. Mississippi," the
rationale of the law of confessions has become a
constitutional issue. That case held for the first
time that the use in a state court trial of a confes-
sion obtained by physical brutality violated the
defendant's due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Since then the law of
confessions has undergone a dramatic development
in a series of Supreme Court decisions holding that
the use of improper methods of interrogation in
obtaining a confession will make its admission in
evidence a violation of federal due process whether
or not it is involuntary under the traditional confes-
sion rule. The Fourteenth Amendment confession
cases have weighed such circumstances as physical
mistreatment, threats, deprivation of food and
sleep, prolonged interrogation, incommunicado
detention, the failure of the police to warn the
defendant of his right not to answer questions, the
refusal to allow communication with counsel, the
use of deception or trickery in questioning and
24 3 Wamsoax, EVIDENCE, §§822, 823 (3d ed. 1940).
" McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
E-ddence, 16 Tx. L. Rxv. 447 (1938). See also Mc-
Cormick, Some Problems and Developments in the
Admissibility of Confessions, 24 Txx. L. REv. 239, 245
(1946).
26 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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failure to comply with statutes requiring that the
prisoner be taken before a judicial officer promptly
after his arrest. The decisions have been thoroughly
analyzed elsewhere.Y Only a few observations are
necessary here.
The cases have reflected disagreement within
the Court about the purpose of the constitutional
rule. Thus the opinions have vacillated between the
"trustworthiness" rationale of the traditional con-
fession rule and an emphasis on enforcing "civilized
standards" of police conduct.28 The Court has
refused to bar all confessions obtained during
pre-arraignment interrogation of persons in
custody29 although one of the Justices has urged
this step.30 At times, the Court has insisted that
the Constitution does not bar "fair" police ques-
tioning of persons denied access to counsel.31 But
the Court has also held that prolonged secret
questioning is "inherently coercive.' 32 Some
opinions have spoken with a logic which, literally
applied, would make all secret police questioning
outlaw.n But even in opinions in which the
27 Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third
Degree, 6 SrAN. L. Rav. 411 (1954); Allen, Due Process
and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw.
U.L. Rzv. 16 (1953); MAGUME, EVIDENCE OF GUILT
c. 3 (1959). The cases are collectedin Annot., 1 L.ED.2d
1735 (1957), supp., 4 L.ED.2d 1833 (1960), and in
note 2 to the Court's opinion in Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959).
8 Compare Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951),
and Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), with
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315 (1959), Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199(1960), and Rogers v. Richmond, 81 S. Ct. 735 (1961).
2 Gallegos and Stein cases cited note 28 supra. See
also Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944), and
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953).310 Justice Douglas, concurring in Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49, 56 (1949).11Crooker and Cicenia cases cited note 23 supra.
2 Aslcraft and Watts cases cited note 28 supra.
3 "It is inconceivable that any court of justice in
the land, conducted as our courts are, open to the
public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to
keep a defendant witness under continuous cross
examination for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep
in an effort to extract a 'voluntary' confession. Nor
can we, consistently with Constitutional due process of
law, hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do
the same thing away from the restraining influences of
a public trial in an open court room."
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
"A confession by which life becomes forfeit must be
the expression of free choice. A statement to be volun-
tary of course need not be volunteered. But if it is the
product of sustained pressure by the police it does not
issue from a free choice. When a suspect speaks because
he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been
subjected to a physical or mental ordeal. Eventual
yielding to questioning under such circumstances is
emphasis is on the conduct of the police, the Court
has described the issue as one of "coercion," thus
continuing to use the terminology of a rule which
turns on the defendant's state of mind.
Ori reading the cases, one is struck by the handi-
caps under which the Court has labored in attempt-
ing to formulate the due process ,rule. Little is
known about the psychology of interrogation and
confession. The ambiguous concepts of coercion
and free choice have invited dispute. And, judging
from the opinions, the records in these cases usually
contain very limited information about the circum-
stances of the interrogation and even less inform-
ation about the defendant's state of mind. Under
all of the circumstances, it is understandable that
the determination in particular cases whether the
defendant's will was "overborne" or the conditions
of questioning "inherently coercive" has often
provoked sharp disagreement.4
In all of the Fourteenth Amendment confession
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
during the past 25 years, the defendant was ques-
tioned without counsel being present. In some
cases, his requests to communicate with a lawyer
were denied; in others, attempts by lawyers to see
him were barred. During these years a parallel
line of decisions has dealt with the right to counsel
plainly the product of the suction process of interroga-
ton and therefor6 the reverse of voluntary. We would
have to shut our minds to the plain significance of what
here transpired to deny that this was a calculated
endeavor to secure a confession through the pressure
of unrelenting interrogation. The very relentlessness
of such interrogation implies that it is better for the
prisoner to answer than to persist in the refusal of
disclosure which is his constitutional right. To turn the
detention of an accused into a process of wrenching
from him evidence which could not be extorted in open
court with all its safeguards, is so grave an abuse of the
power of arrest as to offend the procedural standards of
due process."
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53, 54 (1949).
"The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the police
from using the private, secret custody of either man
or child as a device for wringing confessions from
them."
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
Since the decision in Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547 (1942), the Court has passed on the admissibility
of confessions in twenty cases coming from the state
courts. In only 2 of these cases was the Court unanimous
on the result. Spano and Blackburn cases cited note 28
supra. In Spano, the Court divided 5 to 4 on the ground
for decision. In Blackburn, Justice Clark concurred in
the result. Disagreement in the confession cases is
often phrased in terms of the proper scope of con-
stitutional review of state court findings on the question
of "voluntariness." This is the characteristic approach
of dissenting opinions where the majority holds a
confession inadmissible and reverses.
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itself, typically where the defendant was not
represented at the trial stage and on that basis
challenged the constitutionality of his conviction.
The rule has developed that in capital cases the
trial of an uncounselled defendant is barred by the
Constitution. In other cases, the question is
whether the defendant was denied a fair trial,
considering the nature of the offense, his age,
previous experience with the law and other factors
bearing on his ability to intelligently defend
himself.3 5 The confession and right to counsel cases
converged in Crooker v. California,36 a capital case
in which the defendant was held incommunicado
and his requests for an opportunity to call a lawyer
were denied by the police until he was questioned
and a confession obtained. In a 5 to 4 decision, the
Court held that under the circumstances the con-
fession was not involuntary and also that the denial
of counsel was not prejudicial for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes. The majority opinion began
from the premise that neither police detention and
private questioning of arrested persons nor the
failure of police to comply with local prompt pro-
duction statutes suffice to render a confession so
obtained "involuntary" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In holding the confession voluntary,
the Court emphasized the defendant's age, intelli-
gence and education. He was 31 years old and a
college graduate who had attended the first year
of law school. The Court pointed out that he had
taken a course in criminal law, had shown his
awareness of the inadmissibility of the results of a
lie detector test, had been warned before confessing
that he did not have to answer questions and had
indicated a full awareness of his right to be silent
by the manner of his refusal to answer certain
questions. In rejecting the distinct argument that
the defendant had been denied his right to counsel,
the Court recognized that for constitutional pur-
poses the right to counsel is not limited to the trial
of an accused but also protects a defendant during
pre-trial proceedings if its denial is so prejudicial as
to make the subsequent trial fundamentally unfair.
The same circumstances which had been empha-
sized in holding the confession voluntary persuaded
the majority that no such prejudice or unfairness
was present in Crooker's case which came down
to "a voluntary confession by a college-educated
man with law school training who knew of his
35 The cases are collected at 93 L.ED. 137 (1950)
and 2 L.ED.2d 1644 (1958).
36 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
right to keep silent." The Court refused to accept
the defendant's broad argument that every state
denial of a request to contact counsel violates the
constitutional right to counsel. Justice Clark said
that the rule suggested would have a "devastating
effect on enforcement of criminal law for it would
effectively preclude police questioning-fair as well
as unfair-until the accused was afforded opportu-
nity to call his attorney."'n
The McNabb-Mallory Rule
In confession cases tried in the federal courts,
the Supreme Court has imposed more stringent
restrictions on police interrogation practices than
in the Fourteenth Amendment cases. Starting in
1943 with McNabb v. United Slates,38 the Court
has established the rule that confessions are in-
admissible if obtained by federal officers during an
unlawful detention, that is, when they fail to take
their prisoner before a committing officer without
unnecessary delay following his arrest. The record
in the McNabb case indicated that federal offi-
cers, after arresting the defendants, had failed
to take them promptly before a United States
Commissioner or other committing officer as
required by statute but had first interrogated two
of them intermittently during a period of two days
and the third continuously for five or six hours.
The Court reversed the convictions on the ground
that incriminating admissions obtained during this
questioning had been improperly received into
evidence. The Court read the federal statutes
requiring prompt production of arrested persons
before a committing authority as designed to
avoid "all the the evil implications of secret inter-
rogation of persons accused of crime."' ' Acting to
vindicate this congressional policy and exercising
its supervisory power over the administration of
justice in the federal courts, the Court announced
the doctrine that confessions obtained by federal
officers during an unlawful detention are inadmis-
sible even though they are "voluntary" under
constitutional due process standards.
In the years that followed McNabb its seeming
prohibition of all detention for purposes of ques-
tioning became clouded in uncertainty." The
unanimous opinion in Mallory v. United States
put an end to the major questions about the
37 Id. at 441. See also Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958).
38 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
3 Id. at 344.
40 Hogan & Snee, op. cit supra note 18.
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McNabb rule.Mallory had been arrested as a rape
suspect by the District of Columbia police. Instead
of being taken directly before a committing magis-
strate, he was held at a police station for ques-
tioning, in the course of which he confessed. In
holding the confession inadmissible, the Court
ruled unanimously that Rule 5(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that
an arrested person is to be taken "without unneces-
sary delay" before the nearest available commis-
sioner or committing officer, does not permit delay
for the purpose of questioning which "lends itself,
even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging state-
ments to support the arrest and ultimately his
guilt.")4
The Prompt Production Statutes
In addition to the law of confessions, the other
principal source of law on police questioning is
found in the prompt production statutes which
require that arrested persons be taken to court
"without unnecessary delay," "immediately," or
"forthwith."-1 Interpreting the most common pro-
vision, "without unnecessary delay," the Mallory
case holds broadly that delay by federal officers
for the purpose of questioning their prisoner is not
permitted, although delay for such administrative
procedures as "booking" is proper. The state court
decisions have generally rejected the McNabb-
Mallory rule and treat the violation of a prompt
production statute only as a circumstance to be
considered in deciding whether a resulting confes-
sion was voluntary. These decisions indirectly
sanction delay for the purpose of questioning by
admitting a resulting confession. But the same
court may hold such delay unlawful in a false im-
prisonment suit where the legality of the detention
is the only question.m Similarly, the state courts
have treated refusal to allow access to counsel and
failure to warn the prisoner of his "rights" only as
circumstances bearing on the question whether a
confession was coerced. 4
5
41354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
42 The statutes are cited in note 7 to the Court's
opinion in McNabb v. U. S., 318 U.S. 332, 342 (1943).
The statutes are collected and reproduced at pp. 735
to 748 of the March 1958 Senate Committee Hearings.
43 See references in note 19 supra.
44 See cases cited note 22 supra.
45 See, e.g., People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d
553 (1951), and People v. Valletutti, 297 N.Y. 226,
78 N.E.2d 485 (1948).
The Legality of Secret Questioning
We return to the specific questions with which
this section began. Professor Inbau's conclusion
that state and local police who are not subject to
McNabb and Malloiy rule may lawfully question
persons in privacy "for a reasonable time," which
may extend to several hours, is based on the view
that in a series of decisions between 1949 and 1953
the United States Supreme Court had returned to
the traditional confession rule of "voluntariness"
or "trustworthiness" and had retreated from the
position in some of its earlier cases that prolonged
secret questioning is "iiherently coercive." 4 This
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment confession
cases is arguable in view of the cases decided since
1953.4 However it is not my purpose to dwell on
the present boundaries of the constitutional rule.
Varying facts make the cases difficult to gen-
eralize. The rule and its rationale are in the
course of development and short run prediction
seems a fruitless task.
There is a deeper problem. The legality of secret
questioning does not depend on whether a court
will exclude a resulting confession. If, in order to
carry on such interrogation, the police arrest with-
out probable cause, fail to observe the prisoner's
right to prompt arraignment, deny his right to
bail, violate a statute guaranteeing access to
counsel, or postpone his right to habeas corpus by
keeping his whereabouts unknown-if the police
do any of these things, their interrogation is plainly
unlawful. In se-reral Fourteenth Amendment con-
fession cases the Supreme Court has recognized
that police delay after arrest for the purpose of
questi6ning their prisoner violated one or more
state laws. Indeed, one of the rules in these cases is
that violation of a state prompt production statute
wil not by itself render a resulting confession inad-
missible for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 4"
The courts' refusal to apply an exclusionary rule
to confessions obtained in violation of law does not
make the interrogation practices lawful. Because
the courts have thus far refused to apply such a
rule and because public opinion fails to insist on the
enforcement of state prompt production statutes,
the widespread practice of detaining arrested per-
sons for questioning prior to arraignment exists in
a nether world of openly countenanced illegality.49
4 INBAU & Rxm at 205-08.
See especially Spano, Blackburn, and Rogers cases
cited note 28 supra.
48 Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 186-88 (1953).
4" Secret Detention By The Chicago Police, a Report
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The Legality of Deceptive Questioning
Another issue posed by the interrogation
methods described in Part I of this paper is whether
the techniques which call for the use of deception
by police officers are legally permissible. Professor
Inbau urges that they are and explains that inno-
cent persons are protected adequately since none
of the methods described "are apt to induce an
innocent person to confess a crime he did not
commit."
Do the questioning practices described ade-
quately protect the innocent? In the abstract,
it is not easy to see why a suspect would confess
to a crime he did not commit merely because he is
told that another person has confessed and impli-
cated him or that the police have physical evidence
of his guilt which does not in fact exist. On the
other hand, perhaps a prisoner's sweetheart, told
that he has been unfaithful, might thereby be
given a motive for falsely accusing him.W0 And a
suspect falsely charged with a number of crimes
which he did not commit is apparently expected to
discern an implied threat to be withdrawn upon
confession to the specific offense under investiga-
tion. 5' What seems common sense may not be a
reliable guide in these matters.
The legality of deceptive questioning is also
debatable.u2 Once again, the courts have not dealt
directly with the problem and the only law is found
in the confession cases. The American decisions
have generally refused to bar a confession although
it was obtained by police deception or trickery, so
long as the deception is not believed likely to
produce an untrue confession.u However, this
proposition may require qualification in the light
of standards applied by the United States Supreme
Court in recent years to confessions in both federal
and state cases. The emphasis in McNabb on the
development of "civilized standards of procedure
by the American Civil Liberties- Union, Illinois Divi-
sion (1959); Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the
Law Of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1952).
50 INBAu & REm at 195.
51 O'HARA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 106.
12 As to the "ethics" of deceptive questioning,
consider Professor Williams' comment on the second
part of INBAU & REID:
"An Englishman's reaction to these procedures is
generally squeamish; the American lawyer's tougher
reaction is: 'Why not?' "
Williams, Questioning by the Police: Some Practical
Considerations [1960] Crim. L. R. 325, 337.
513 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE, §841 (3d ed. 1940). But
see Rogers v. Richmond, 81 S. Ct. 735 (1961), which
casts constitutional doubts on this rule.
and evidence," could be applied to bar the use of
trickery or deception to obtain a confession al-
though the issue is not likely to arise in federal
cases so long as McNabb and Mallory continue to
exclude all confessions obtained by federal officers
during a period of illegal detention without regard
to the methods by which such confessions are
obtained.
Two recent Fourteenth Amendment opinions in-
dicate that the use of trickery and deception by
police interrogators may create constitutional prob-
lems. In Leyra v. Denno, 4 the Court emphasized the
fact that a psychiatrist employed by the police to
question the defendant had interrogated him at
length after misrepresenting himself as a physician
desiring to give him medical relief from a painful
sinus attack. In Spano v. New York, the Court
held that the defendant's confession had been
obtained by unconstitutional means under the
following circumstances: The defendant had al-
ready been indicted. He surrendered after having
been advised by counsel to answer no questions.
He was then questioned almost continuously for
approximately eight hours and his requests to see
his lawyer were denied. He abandoned his refusal
to answer any questions only after a policeman
who was a boyhood friend repeatedly played on
his sympathy by falsely telling him that a tele-
phone call which the defendant had made to him
had jeopardized the policeman's job and threatened
disaster to the policeman's pregnant wife and three
children. The court held that the defendant's
"will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue
and, sympathy falsely aroused." 55
Although the circumstances of these cases do
not lend themselves to generalization, the opinions
suggest reservations about any unqualified asser-
tion that the use of deception in interrogation is
lawful.
On the whole, police interrogation practices
appear to be little governed by law. The principal
legal restrictions are found in the confession cases.
But it must be recognized that law which deals
only with the admissibility of confessions has an
extremely limited effect on police questioning
practices. It applies only in a small fraction of
the actual cases in which persons are arrested and
questioned by the police. It may mean nothing
-4347 U.S. 556 (1954).
55 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).
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to the large number of persons who are arrested
and questioned but released without being charged
with a crime, those who confess and plead guilty,
and those who are tried on evidence other than a
confession, perhaps evidence obtained from leads
provided by a confession improperly obtained.
III. QUESTIONS FOR RESEARCH
The argument for secret questioning is an argu-
ment from necessity, not from principle. No one
says that such interrogation is good in itself but
it is defended as a way of solving criminal cases
which cannot be solved in any other way. The ar-
gument is based on factual assumptions and it
calls for empirical proof which we do not have.
Instead, the argument is rested entirely on the
judgment of law enforcement officials. This judg-
ment is entitled to great respect but cannot be ac-
cepted as conclusive. The police official character-
istically reasons from individual cases, frequently
those in which questioning produced a confession
and which, in retrospect, he does not believe could
have been solved in any other way. It is not, of
course, possible to determine what might happen if
the police were effectively denied the power to
engage in secret questioning and thus compelled to
stress or develop other methods of investigation.
Like the rest of us, the police tend to be limited by
the bounds of their experience. The established
practice inevitably appears to be the only one
that will work. Untried alternatives are dismissed
without adequate evaluation.
The complexity of the phenomena .and the
practical difficulties of experimentation offer little
encouragement to empirical study of the relation-
ship between the variables of law enforcement and
interrogation. Nevertheless, the police need for
secret questioning does involve some problems
which could be studied empirically and others
which would be difficult to research but are useful
to discuss because they emphasize how little we
know of the facts.
1. The starting point for any empirical research
should be the actual interrogation practices of the
police. The problem here is not defining the ques-
tions but gaining access to the data. The goal
should be to substitute systematically organized
and objective descriptive data for the "common
knowledge" of lawyers and newspapermen. Em-
phasis on the problem of the third degree has
undoubtedly accounted for much police defensive-
ness in the face of proposals for objective observa-
tion of practices normally concealed from public
view. The most ambitious empirical study of police
practices in recent times tried to avoid the appear-
ance of 'looking for wrongdoing' but what has
been seen of the resulting report contains little
useful information on interrogation practices. 6
It should be possible to plan programs for im-
partial observation of police questioning practices
which will win the cooperation of professional
police administrators. Observers whose presence
is unknown to those being viewed could watch
and listen from behind one-way windows. Judging
from the police manuals, the interrogation rooms
of many police stations are already equipped for
such observation. There would be difficulties but
they should be solvable with the experience of
social scientists who have handled similar prob-
lems in other fields.
2. How does a police force function when it is
denied the right to use secret interrogation? How
have the District of Columbia police adapted
themselves to the McNabb and Mallory decisions?
Are there other police departments which have
been forced by court decision or administrative
changes to discontinue the questioning of sus-
pects held incommunicado? In the 1957 House
Committee hearings, Assistant Attorney General
Olney said that despite the Mallory decision the
police "cannot close up shop" and that if crim-
inals were to be released the action would have
to be taken by the courts in each case and not by
action by the police in advance.57 However, there
are indications that the District of Columbia
police have endeavored to comply with the Mallory
rule in order not to hamper successful prosecutions.
Oliver Gasch, the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia, told the 1957 House Com-
mittee hearings that the Mallory decision had
created an emergency situation requiring im-
mediate legislative action.-s However, experience
seems to have reduced his concern. In a 1960
address, Mr. Gasch criticized as "too speculative"
56 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE ADmNImsR-
TION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
(Pilot Project Report) (1958). This unpublished seven
volume report identifies some persons and places ob-
served, and citations or quotations are forbidden. The
pilot project study will be described in a book to be
published in the near future. Remington, Criminal Jus-
lice Research, 51 J. Cusm. L., C. & P.S. 7, 18 (1960). The
plan for the study is set forth in SHERRY & PETTIS,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1955).
57 1957 House Committee Hearings at 187.
6s Id. at 13.
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the view that Mallory led to the subsequent sharp
rise in crime in the District. He spoke with pride
of his success in training District police officials
to understand and follow the Mallory rule. Mr.
Gasch said that Mallory questions are of con-
trolling importance in less than five per cent of
his criminal prosecutions 9 and that as the result
of police department cooperation and the training
program, District of Columbia police are making
better cases by carrying on more extensive in-
vestigation prior to the arrest of suspects. He
added that the accumulation of other evidentiary
material has become standard operating proce-
dure, reliance upon confessions has been minimized
and police work generally has become more
thorough and exact.60
The Mallory decision has provided an unusual
opportunity to study the effects of a change in
the rules. Detailed information should be gathered
about the ways in which the District of Columbia
police have modified their investigation and ques-
tioning practices as a result of that change. Also,
an opportunity for comparative study is afforded
by the 1960 decision of the Michigan Supreme
Court adopting the McNabb-Mallory rule.2
3. The Phenomenon of Confession. There are
many fascinating questions about the psychology
of confession to crime. Some objective correlations
between confessions and the conditions of interro-
gation might be illuminating. How often do inter-
rogations produce confessions? How often are
confessions obtained without an interrogation?
Is it possible to generalize about the length and
type of interrogation which is most likely to
produce a confession in given types of cases or
from given types of offenders? It would be inter-
esting, for example, to know how often questioning
19 Compare Chief Murray's testimony ,in 1957 that
perhaps as many as 90% of major crimes are solved
after the subject is brought in and questioned. 1957
House Committee Hearings at 43.
60 Gasch, "Law Enforcement in the District of
Columbia and Civil Rights," unpublished address of
March 25, 1960, to Twelfth Annual Conference, Na-
tional Civil Liberties Clearing House, Washington,
D. C. The summary in the text is based on a mimeo-
graphed copy. Mr. Gasch's speech was reported in the
Washington Post, March 26, 1960, p. Dl.
The interesting lectures and discussions on the
Mallory rule held by Mr. Gasch and members of his
staff with officers of the District Police Department
are reprinted in July 1958 Senate Committee Hearings
at 396-421. In his 1960 address, Mr. Gasch said that
these lectures and discussions had been regularly re-
peated since they were first given in March, 1958.
60. People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d
738 (1960).
produces a confession from previous offenders.
The suspect who has already had brushes with
the law is more likely to know of his right not to
answer questions and to realize that incriminating
statements will be used against him. Does this
mean that confessions from professional criminals
are more likely to be the result of special pressure
or coercion? Does a subject who has once had a
lawyer or a court explain that he need not
answer police questions remember and act on this
advice? What is the effect of advising the suspect
of his rights at the outset of the interrogation or
allowing him access to counsel promptly upon
arrest? It is tempting to assume that advice of
counsel or a caution will make questioning useless
but it may be that more powerful tendencies are
at work in the mind of the offender.
.What are the psychological consequences of
interrogation after arrest? Judges, like the rest
of us, seem to know very little about this. They
have been handicapped by the ambiguity of the
concept of voluntary choice and by the typical
paucity of information available to appellate
court judges about the conditions of interrogation
and the defendant's state of mind. The distinction
between voluntary and coerced admissions is
little help. As Justice Jackson pointed out, it is
strange to speak of any confession as involuntary
since any confession, even under duress, is the
product of some deliberate choice.6' He acknowl-
edged that arrest, detention and questioning are
inherently coercive and "put pressure upon the
prisoner to answer questions, to answer them
truthfully, and to confess if guilty." Instead of
focusing on the pressure applied to the subject,
he suggested that "the real issue is strength of
character," whether the confession is the result
of "free choice," or, put another way, whether
the confessor was "in possession of his own will
and self-control at the time of the confession."
However, it is not dear what would be gained by
asking about the defendant's strength of character,
the degree of his self-control or his freedom to
choose, instead of whether his admissions were
voluntary. 2
11 The summary of Justice Jackson's views in this
paragraph is based upon his dissenting opinion in
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 156 (1944).
62 For an analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment
confession cases in terms of "objective" and "subjec-
tive" tests employed by the Court see Cohn, Federal
Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Coerced Confes-
sions in State Courts, 50 J. Can. L., C. & P.S. 265
(1959).
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It is interesting to rethink the free will as-
sumptions implicit in the idea of coercion in light
of the modem view that the offender has a strong,
unconscious urge to reveal himself.63 The existence
of some such tendency is observed in professional
police literature." Compare Wigmore's confident
generalization:
"Every guilty person is almost always ready
and desirous to confess, as soon as he is detected
and arrested.... The nervous pressure of
guilt is enormous; the load of the deed done is
heavy; the fear of detection fills the con-
sciousness; and when detection comes, the
pressure is relieved; and the deep sense of relief
makes confession a satisfaction. At that moment,
he will tell all, and-tell it truly. To forbid solicit-
ing him, to seek to prevent this relief, is to fly
in the face of human nature."
65
The ultimate question about the psychology of
confession in this context is the extent to which
the experience of being isolated and interrogated
after arrest operates as pressure on the prisoner
to give admissions which are sought by his inter-
rogators. To what extent this type of pressure
could lead some persons to confess, although
innocent, is one question. Another question is
whether for some persons interrogation in isolation
may not be the psychological equivalent of threats
or force. It is hard to escape the suspicion that
sustained secret interrogation by itself in many
cases implicitly suggests kinds of pressure which
should not be allowed."
4. Apart from the incriminating statements
which it produces, does secret questioning have
63 See generally REi, THE CompuISioN To CON-
FEss (1959); ROGGE, WHY MEN CoNaEss (1959).
64 See INBAu & REm pt. II and references cited
note 7 supra.
65 3 WIGMORE EVIDENCE §851 at 319 (3d ed. 1940).66 
"With a person behind bars, police have a certain
leverage that is valuable. The fellow in handcuffs,
without the immediate prospect of freedom, is likely
to be quite voluble-if he believes it is the key to thejail door." MULBAR, INTERROGATION 35 (1951).
Consider also two contrasting judicial views: "A
prolonged interrogation of an accused who is ignor-
ant of his rights and who has been cut off from the
moral support of friends and relatives is not infre-
quently an effective technique of terror." Blackburn
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). "We are not
ready to say that the pressure to disclose crime, in-
volved in decent detention and lengthy examination,
although we admit them to be 'inherently coercive,'
are denied to a State by the Constitution, where they
are not proved to have passed the individual's ability
to resist and to admit, deny, or refuse to answer."
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 170 (1944) (dis-
senting opinion).
other consequences which affect the efficiency of
criminal investigation and prosecution? In the
United States it is often said that police abuse of
prisoners is one of the important causes of com-
munity distrust of the police.67 Juries may reflect
community suspicions that police mistreatment of
prisoners is frequent, tend to distrust police testi-
mony and in some cases acquit guilty defendants.
A more subtle corruption of the jury may also be
traceable to interrogation practices. When the
search for confessions becomes a principal tactic
in police work and a large percentage of prosecu-
tions depend on confessions, juries may come to
feel that a charge unsupported by a confession is
weaker than it really is. The jury thus may be un-
reasonably reluctant to convict unless the prose-
cution produces a confession.It is important to learn more about public
attitudes toward the police. Are there significant
differences in attitude toward the police among
various social, economic and racial groups? 6
67 See generally NATIONAL ComamIsSIoN ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (The Wickersham
Commission), REPORT ON LAwixsssass N LAW
ENFoRcENmrr (1931).6
s See the interesting study of public attitudes toward
the Los Angeles police force described in GouRLEY,
PuBLic RELATIONs AD THE PoLiCE (1953). This
survey utilized a carefully constructed questionnaire
which listed 22 to pics dealing with various phases of
police activity. The subjects were asked to choose
among four alternative views on each topic. Three of
the topics were the following:
"Treatment of Suspects
1. Respect constitutional rights of suspected crimi-
nals.
2. Use whatever degree of force found convenient.
3. Often conscienceless and brutal in performing
duties.
4. Do not know.
Protection of Innocent
1. Careful not to arrest innocent persons.
2. Occasionally arrest innocent persons.
3. Indifferent whether persons arrested are innocent
or not.
4. Do not know.
Minority Groups
1. Usually fair in dealing with minority groups.
2. Sometimes unfriendly in dealing with minority
groups.
3. Definitely prejudiced against minority groups.
4. Do not know."
Among the trends observed in the data collected were
these: persons over 55 were most favorably inclined
toward the Los Angeles Police Department; men were
more favorably inclined than women; -whites more
than Mexicans and Negroes least favorably inclined;
those with least schooling were more favorably inclined
with college graduates expressing the least approval;
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What are the police practices, real or supposed,
which underlie these attitudes? With information,
it could become, possible to discuss whether the
elimination of secrecy in questioning prisoners
would contribute to increased public confidence
and consequent benefits to law enforcement which
might outweigh the disadvantages seen by the
police in such a move.
5. What is the relationship of secret questioning
td police brutality? Secret interrogation in quest
of a confession is usually described as the setting
in which police brutality occurs. Here, too, closer
analysis is needed. If investigation were possible,
it might be discovered that a significant amount
of police brutality is not, as often supposed, part
of an attempt to secure a confession.
William Westley, a sociologist who closely ob-
served a middle-western urban police department,
reported that the use of violence was often justi-
fied by the police not as a means of coercing con-
fessions but as a way of coercing respect. 73 officers,
approximately 50% of all patrolmen in the city
studied, were asked, "When do you think a po-
liceman is justified in roughing a man up? The
following table summarizes the answers:
Type of Response Frequency Percentage
Disrespect for Police 27 37
When impossible to avoid 17 23
To obtain information 14 19
To make an arrest 6 8
For the hardened criminal






Professor Westley explains the responses in
terms of the problems of the police who encounter
continual hostility and criticism from the public
and have as one of their major emotional needs
securing respect from the public. His data suggest
except for public servants, unskilled laborers were
the occupational group most favorably inclined; among
the lowest votes of confidence were those expressed
by professional persons, students and housewives.
Housewives answered "Do not know" most often;
school teachers, especially females, rated police con-
sistently lower than the average for all professionals,
accountants consistently higher, entertainers generally
thought poorly of the police as, with certain exceptions,
did lawyers. The respondents were also invited to give
free answers about personal contacts with policemen.
Most of the unfavorable comments referred to unjusti-
fied tickets or arrests, rough treatment, inconsistency
in traffic enforcement or unjustified questioning.
69 Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 Am. J. Soci-
OLOGY 34, 38 (1953).
that the causes of police brutality are more subtle
than is usually assumed.
Professor Westley describes the psychological
plight of the policeman, responsible for enforcing
laws about which the community often has mixed
feelings, encouraged toward cynicism by his
observations of corruption and the seamy side of
life, prone to normal reactions of anger and the
desire to punish wrongdoers, impatient with the
delays and failures of the courts, and faced with
a hostile and suspicious public. Rewarded poorly
in status and pay, the police tend to identify as a
group against the community whose suspicions
and constant criticism are thought unjustified.
Secrecy becomes a vital part of the policeman's
code, particularly his unwillingness to be a
"stoolie" who betrays the confidence or misdeeds
of a fellow policeman. Westley asked 85 policemen
representing all ranks how they thought the general
public felt about the police. 73 per cent felt that
the public was against and hated the police and
14 per cent thought that part of the public was
for and part was against the police. Only 13 per
cent thought that the public likes the police.70
William Whyte's study of a Chicago neighbor-
hood observes:
"There are prevalent in society two general
conceptions of the duties of the police officer.
Middle-class people feel that he should enforce
the law without fear or favor. Cornerville
people and many of the officers themselves
believe that the policeman should have the
confidence of the people in his area so that
he can settle many difficulties in a personal
manner without making arrests. These two
conceptions are in a large measure contradic-
tory. The policeman who takes a strictly
legalistic view of his duties cuts himself off
from the personal relations necessary to enable
him to serve as a mediator of disputes in his
area. The policeman who develops close ties
with local people is unable to act against them
with the vigor prescribed by-the law ...
"Observation of the situation in Cornerville
indicates that the primary function of the
police department is not the enforcement of
the law but the regulation of illegal activities.
70 WESTLEY, THE POLICE: A SOcIOLOGICAL STuDY OF
LAW, CusTom AND MORALITY 160 (1951) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis in the University of Chicago library).
See also Westley, Secrecy and the Police, 34 SOCIAL
FORcES 254 (1956) and NATIONAL CoinfissION ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE
POLICE (1931).
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The policeman is subject to'sharply conflicting
social pressures. On one side are the 'good
people' of Eastern City, who have written their
moral judgments into the law and demand
through their newspapers that the law be
enforced. On the other side are the people of
Comerville, who have different standards and
have built up an organization whose perpetua-
tion depends upon freedom to violate the law.
Socially, the local officer has more in common
with Comerville people than with those who
demand law enforcement, and the financial
incentives offered by the racketeers have an
influence which is of obvious importance....
He (the policeman) must play an elaborate
role of make-believe, and in so doing, he serves
as a buffer between divergent social organiza-
tions with their conflicting standards of
conduct."'
n
We know too little of the values and attitudes
of policemen and the social setting in which they
live and work. And yet these matters have a vital
bearing on the problems of criminal law enforce-
ment and police practice. In short, we need a
sociology and psychology not only for the criminal
but for the police and public as well in order to
escape the confines of conventional argument
about police practices.
In recent years we have been assured in some
quarters that the people may be expected to
decide major issues of personal liberty wisely
once they are given "the facts." And it has be-
come almost conventional to decry the lack of
factual information available about police prac-
tices and the effect of legal restrictions on law
enforcement. The clarion call for research threatens
to become a liberal platitude. However such em-
pirical research as seems feasible will not take us
very far in resolving the difficult issues about police
interrogation powers. Information may be useful
in tempering extravagant predictions that legal
restrictions threaten a "breakdown in law enforce-
ment." And a greater understanding of the
sociology and psychology of the police and the
public may be helpful in countering hostile stereo-
types of the police interrogator as a Torquemada
in modem dress.
But no amount of information can resolve the
issues raised by secret questioning in the absence
71 Wntm, STREET CORNER SocrTv 136, 138 (1943).
df some objective standards by which police
efficiency can be judged. To give a crude example,
are the police doing a satisfactory job if 50% of
all robberies and 75% of all murders and rapes
are solved and the offenders convicted? The police
and the public are not accustomed to think in
these terms. The police inevitably feel the strongest
pressures and demands of the public in connection
with individual cases. The policeman's world and
needs are concrete and particular. The situations
with which he deals are typically acute and not
conducive to reflection about what the general
rules ought to be. This is why the law has wisely
insisted that other functionaries do the judging.
The way of the law is not easy. It is a truism
that our system of criminal justice is willing to
pay the price of letting ten guilty men go free
in order to prevent one unjustified conviction.
But this expresses an attitude and not a formula.
The result may become less clear if the first num-
ber in the equation is known and turns out to be
100 or 1,000.
The law is abstract and often cold comfort in
the face of the individual human crises which are
the stuff of police work. But the solution of single
crimes cannot be made the test for procedural rules.
Experience indicates that a very substantial
portion of all crimes cannot be solved nor is it
necessary that they be solved in order to main-
tain reasonably orderly and secure communities.7 2
Indeed it seems probable that the great bulk of
crimes are never even reported to the police or,
if reported, are disposed of summarily by a police
decision not to proceed further. 3
Police efficiency cannot be judged in a humane
society by the results of particular cases. Once this
is recognized, it becomes clear that the problem of
the unwitnessed crime which seems unsolvable
without a confession does not resolve the basic is-
sues about police interrogation. Even if we knew
the comparative frequency of such crimes and had
some agreed standards for judging'police efficiency,
the more fundamental question would still remain:
To what extent should police effectiveness be the
ultimate test? The competing values of personal
liberty are not entirely based on pragmatic
reasoning.
72 Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire
Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1954).
73 See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke
the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the
Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L. J. 543 (1960).
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IV. SOME- SECONDARY ISSUES: TnE LENGTH OF
PERISSIBLE INTERROGATION, CAUTIONING
THE SUSPECT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY
CONFESSION RULES
The Length of Permissible Interrogation
For how long should the police be permitted to
question an arrested person prior to taking him
before a magistrate? This is a secondary question
which is reached only after resolving the funda-
mental issue of whether any detention for police
interrogation is to be allowed.74 It is submitted
that if we accept the propriety of such detention,
then there is no rational basis for limiting its
length except police discretion, subject to inevit-
ably ineffective supervision by the courts.
The choice is between a specific time limit, such
as 12 or 24 hours,75 and a flexible standard, such
as "a reasonable time," which is intended to allow
some interrogation. A specific time limit assumes
the need for some questioning. It also recognizes
that unlimited police questioning is inconsistent
with personal liberty and pregnant with dangers
of abuse. But a short time limit does not solve the
problem of abuses. The possibility that prisoners
may be mistreated in the course of police ques-
tioning arises primarily from the secrecy of the
proceeding. A short time limit may only be a
stopwatch which underlines the necessity for less
leisurely methods. A specific time limit is also
unsatisfactory from the point of view of the police
74 Delay in arraignment for other purposes such as
collateral investigation or avoiding a warning to con-
federates is outside the scope of this discussion.75 This was the approach of some congressional pro-
posals following the Mallory decision, e.g., S. 2432,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (12 hour arraignment requirement
to apply only in the District of Columbia) and S. 3355,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (12 hour requirement plus addi-
tional time reasonably necessary where it is impossible
to comply with the 12 hour requirement). A specific
time limit is also prescribed in a few state statutes.
See references in note 21, supra. These proposals and
statutes do not refer to interrogation and sanction it
only by implication. But see the novel suggestion in
Note, Prearraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-
Mallory Miasma, 68 YALE L. J. 1003 (1959). The
author proposes an amendment to Federal Rule 5(b)
barring any interrogation prior to an arrestee's produc-
tion before a federal commissioner. The commissioner
would advise the prisoner that he is not required to
answer questions. He would not tell him that any
statement may be used against him, nor would the
prisoner be told of his right to counsel, as this would
be "premature." The prisoner would then be removed
by the police who could question him for a maximum
of 3 hours. The prisoner would again be brought before
the commissioner, given the remaining advice now re-
quired by Rule 5(b), and given a physical examination
if he alleges that violence was used.
because of its inflexibility. Any fixed amount of
time is likely to be inadequate for the police in
the most difficult cases. Any requirement designed
for the most difficult cases tends to harden into a
practice utilized in all cases, petty and serious
alike. Unused power is the exception. 6
Although arbitrary from either point of view, a
specific time limit would at least be dear. But it is
doubtful whether a police department whose
detention practices are now unlawful will comply
with any new standard, however clear, if it does
not in effect permit existing detention practices or
if no new sanction is devised to ensure observance.
Any rule which diverges sharply from present
practice and the felt needs of the police is likely to
lead to evasion. In other words, any time limit
must not only be dear, it must also work. This
means that it must be understood and accepted by
the police.
Professor Inbau urges that the police be allowed
a "reasonable" time for interrogating suspects.
The interview must be "unhurried"; it may
extend to several hours, "depending on various
factors such as the nature of the case situation and
the personality of the suspect."' In the 1943
House Committee hearings, Attorney General
Biddle urged the adoption of a standard requiring
arraignment "within a reasonable time." He
suggested that this would allow some flexibility
and discretion to the police and that any abuses of
discretion would be checked by the courts as they
worked out more specific rules on a case to case
basis.78
7 See generally Secret Detention By The Chicago
Police, a Report by the American Civil Liberties Union,
Illinois Division (1959). The Chafee report pointed out
that the Washington police "have taken their time for
investigating all sorts of run-of-the-mill offenses. The
argument that civil liberties must go by the board when
the State is in real danger hardly applies to the theft of
a saxophone." See 1943 House Committee Hearings
at page 54. See also the case described at page 49 of the
same hearings in which the prisoner was held two days
for investigation after the theft of a wallet containing
$2.50, a cheap watch and a pack of cigarets.
See the testimony of the Chief Postal Inspector of
the Post Office Department during the 1957 House
Committee Hearings. Mr. Stephens pointed out that
in most postal theft cases the evidence is fairly con-
clusive before the defendant is taken into custody.
Nevertheless he insisted that the Mallory decision
would hamper investigations since "it would result,
occasionally, in innocent people probably being charged.
And, in addition, it would have the effect of charging
the man first and then completing the investigation,
instead of the other way around." 1957 House Committee
Hearings at 96.
77 43 ILL. L. Rv. 442, 450 (1948).
78 1943 House Committee Hearings at 27 et seq.
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But how are the courts to decide what is "reason-
able?" Is the test to be whether the police feel
that they have exhausted the possibilities of
obtaining information by further interrogation?
Is it to be whether they have had an adequate
opportunity to try the sympathetic approach, the
"friend and enemy act," "bluffing on a split pair"
and the other formulae in the interrogator's
guide? How many times should it be proper to
urge the prisoner to confess before reasonable
interrogation has come to an end? Is the reason-
ableness of the interrogation opportunity to be
measured by the result? How many times should
the police be "reasonably" entitled to press for an
answer or refuse to accept explanations which
they think false? Is the length of "reasonable"
interrogation to vary directly or inversely with
the determination of the prisoner to remain silent
or persist in answers which the police disbelieve?79
Judges have no special expertise in the art of
criminal investigation. They are not equipped to
judge the necessities of investigation in specific
cases. If governed by a flexible rule dearly intended
to allow some police questioning, the courts would
be reluctant to second-guess police strategy in any
particular case. A flexible standard would thus
lead the courts to defer to police discretion.
The issue is not how long the police shall be
permitted to hold suspects before they account to
a court but whether detention for the purpose of
private questioning should be allowed at all. Once
such detention is sanctioned in principle it seems
impossible to formulate a limit on the duration of
the interrogation which will eliminate the dangers
of abuse or provide any effective judicial control
over police discretion in dealing with arrested
persons.
Cautioning the Suspect
Should the suspect be informed of his rights
before he is interrogated by the police? Generally,
the American decisions have not required that
police warn suspects that they are not required to
answer questions. However, failure to caution is a
circumstance which may be considered in deciding
whether a resulting confession was voluntary80
71 Consider the application of a standard of "reason-
ableness" to the facts of Spano v. New York, note 28
supra, where the defendant persisted on his attorney's
prior advice in refusing to answer questions and con-
fessed only after almost 8 hours of questioning and
four separate sessions with his policeman boyhood
friend.
8o Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
In several Fourteenth Amendment confession
cases, the failure of police interrogators to caution
the defendant was one of the circumstances stressed
by the United States Supreme Court in holding
that subsequent confessions were obtained by
unconstitutional means.81
It appears that police practice in the United
States does not ordinarily include cautioning
suspects in custody before they are questioned.
The Inbau and Reid manual emphasizes that in
the absence of such a specific requirement, it is
unnecessary for an interrogator to "warn an
offender of his constitutional rights before ob-
taining his confession."82 Testimony in the 1957
House Committee hearings indicated that in
Washington, D. C., the practice was to inform a
suspect at the time that oral statements are reduced
to writing that he is not obliged to make any
statement but no warning was given before or dur-
ing his interrogation. Police officials said that a
caution before questioning would lead the subject
not to make any incriminating statements. Chief
Murray said,
"I think as we go out and pick up a man for
rape or murder and if we tell him, in effect, that
anything you tell me may be sufficient to put
you in jail, I don't think he is going to tell us
very much."8
The Chief Postal. Inspector of the Post Office De-
partment thought that warning a suspect of his
rights "would be, in effect, suggesting to the in-
dividual in many cases that he should not make a
statement. I don't believe that it would be in the
interests of reliable law enforcement."M4
It would be interesting to know whether the
usual assumption about the effect of a caution is
borne out by experience. The United States At-
torney for the District of Columbia advised the
March, 1958, Senate Committee hearings that he
had recently suggested to District of Columbia
police officials that all arrested persons be warned
prior to any interrogation that they are not re-
quired to make a statement and that any statement
might be used against them. He believed that the
suggestion would be adopted85 It should be possi-
ble to find out whether since that time the District
of Columbia police have followed the practice of
8
' See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, note 28 supra.
12 INBAu & REm at 223.
83 1957 House Committwe'Hearings at 37.
8 Id. at 100.85 March 1958 Senate Committee Hearings at 108.
See also references cited note 60 supra.
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cautioning suspects before questioning and how, if
at all, this has affected the number and types of
statements obtained.
The Judges' Rules under which the British
police operate provide that an investigating officer
may question any person, whether suspected
or not, but whenever he has made up his mind to
charge a person with a crime he must first caution
the subject before asking any questions or any
further questions, as the case may be. Rule No. 3
broadly prohibits questioning persons in custody
even after they are cautioned.86 But it is not clear
whether the Judges' Rules are now followed by the
British police or whether the judges themselves
enforce the rules. There are indications that it is
common practice for the British police to question
without cautioning persons they have decided to
charge and also to question suspects in a police
station.87 Moreover we are told that the British
86 The Judges Rules as amended through 1957 are
reprinted in an appendix to DEVLN, TnE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND (1958). They may also
be found in MORIARTY, POLICE LAW 65-67 (14th ed.
1957). See also L. R. (1918) 1 K.B. 539; 6 POLICE
JOURAL 342, 353 (1933).
8 Commander Hatherill of the New Scotland Yard
Criminal Investigation Department says that it is his
practice to postpone giving a caution in the course
of interrogation by the expedient of deferring his
decision to charge a suspect. He says that he charges
a suspect "before I reached the point where I felt there
would be no further doubt in anybody's mind."
HATHERILL, INTERNATIONAL LECTURES ON POLICE
SCIENCE, SECOND INSTITUTE OF THE LAW-MEDICINE
CENTER, WESTERN RESERvE UNIvERIrrY 37 (1955).
See also memorandum of Professor Harry Street in
the March 1958 Senate Committee Hearings at 13, 15.
L6rd Justice Devlin indicates that it may not be so
easy to avoid the rules in this way since counsel can
object on the ground that the police officer at a certain
point must have decided to charge the accused and
therefore should have administered a caution before
proceeding further. "If the evidence which the police
had up to this point was strong and clearly pointed to
the accused, the officer will find it difficult to maintain
under cross-examination that he had not yet made up
his mind to charge the accused. In practice, the Judge
tends to make his own assessment of the evidence;
and if he thinks it strong enough, he will not put much
value on assertions by the police officer that he was
still in doubt." DEVAIN, op. cit. supra note 86, at 34-36.
The 1929 Report of the Royal Commission on Police
Powers and Procedure, CmD. 'No. 3297, recognized
that the Judges Rules, by making the warning require-
ment turn on the interrogator's decision to charge,
invite tactical delay by the police. The Commission
concluded that since the purpose of the Rules is to
inform persons that they are not obliged to make
incriminating statements the spirit of the Rules re-
quires a caution at the outset of an interview.
Professor Williams describes a number of recent cases
in which the police appear to have detained suspects
for questioning and to have carried on interrogation of
persons in custody. Williams, Questioning by the Police:
Some Practical Considerations, [1960] CRIM. L. R. 325,
328-31.
judges "at the present time tend to wink at
breaches of the Rules, at any rate if the charge is a
serious one" and that "it is no longer the practice
to exclude evidence obtained by questioning in
custbdy."' ' s
It is hard to see any justification in principle
for not ensuring that every person in imminent
jeopardy of a criminal charge knows of his right
not to answer questions and his right to counsel.
These rights are probably more important at the
police stage of criminal proceedings than at any
other time. However, as the English experience
just described indicates, any rule which requires
a caution inevitably invites avoidance. Even if it
is tied to an objective event such as the com-
mencement of interrogation or the time of arrest,
the probable conflict of testimony about whether a
required caution was in fact given makes satis-
factory judicial enforcement doubtful. Any rule
requiring a warning is also likely to be ineffectual
since the significance and effect of a warning
depend primarily on emphasis and the spirit in
which it is given. A warning can easily become a
meaningless ritual.8 9
Putting enforcement difficulties to one side, it is
easier to say that some warning should be given
than to determine when this should be done. The
Judges Rules regard the officer's decision to charge
88 Williams, op. cit. supra note 87, at 328, 331. Re-
cently a committee of British lawyers reported that
forms of "brain washing" are used in British police
station interrogations. The report describes practices
resembling the "friend and enemy act" (see INBAU
& REm at 165). Preliminary Investigation of Criminal
Offences, a Report by Justice (The British section of
the International Commission of Jurists) (1960), re-
printed in [1960] Cnmi. L. Rxv. 793; New York Times,
January 29, 1961, p. 71. The report will be presented
to the Royal Commission on Police whose formation
was announced in December, 1959. The Commission
has been directed to examine the role and responsi-
bilities of the British police and their relationship to
the public. This will be the first such study since that
of the historic Royal Commission of 1929. It is inter-
preted as a response to deteriorating relations between
the British police and the public following "some widely
publicized cases in which policemen were accused of
unnecessary violence or even found implicated in
crimes." New York Times, December 17, 1959, p. 75.
One British observer has expressed regret that the
Commission does not intend to consider police inter-
rogation powers and practices except insofar as they
affect public confidence in the police. Editorial, [1960]
CRI. L.R. 293.
"... [W]e cannot give any weight to recitals which
merely formalize constitutional requirements." Justice
Douglas in the plurality opinion in Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948). Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S.
191, 193 (1957), indicates that a caution, along with
the other circumstances of an interrogation, must be
considered in the light of the defendant's mentality and
experience.
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the suspect with the crime or his arrest as the
critical time. But it may be that a lesser degree of
suspicion should bring the principle into play. If
there .are compromising circumstances, although
suspicion has not ripened yet into accusation, in-
terrogation of the suspect is likely to become a
quest for incriminating admissions and the logic of
the right to silence should require a warning. 0
The idea of the caution seems to reflect an un-
easy recognition of the fact that the roles of in-
terrogator and suspect are antagonistic. The in-
terrogator has the advantage of authority,
sophistication and, after arrest, physical control
over the suspect. The notion that he should pre-
cede questioning with a caution suggests that the
interrogator should act to protect the interests of
the suspect at the same time that he is attempting
to obtain damaging statements from him.9 But
this cannot effectively substitute for the loyalty of
counsel or the disinterestedness of a judge. The
chief significance of the caution may well be that
it serves to remind the police officer that he is sub-
ject to legal and moral limitations in dealing with
his prisoner and thus counteracts to some extent
the attitudes which are so easily engendered by his
position of authority over the suspect.
The Exclusionary Cofession Rules
Characteristically, much of the discussion about
police interrogation practices in the United States
has focussed on the question of remedies for a
person from whom the police have obtained a can-
fession by improper means. The common law of
coerced confessions and tort remedies for false
imprisonment and assault have proved inadequate
9 S.3325, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced by Senator
Morse, during the post-Mallory congressional debate,
would have gone further than the Judges Rules. This
proposal provided that every person accused or sus-
pected of a crime, whether or not in custody, should
not be questioned without first being informed of the
nature of the offense, his right to have counsel present,
his right not to make any statement and that any
statement could be used against him in a criminal
prosecution. Any statement obtained without such a
warning would be inadmissible. Compare the views of
the 1929 Royal Commission, note 87 supra.
1Compare Lord Justice Devlin's view: "The real
significance of the caution is that it is, so to speak, a
declaration of war. By it the police announce that they
are no longer representing themselves to the man they
are questioning as the neutral inquirer whom the good
citizen ought to assist; they are the prosecution and are
without right, legal or moral, to further help from the
accused; no man, innocent or guilty, need thereafter
reproach himself for keeping silent, for that is what
they have just told him he may do." DEvLiN, op. cit.
supra note 86, at 37.
to deal with the problem of interrogation abuses.n
The resulting concern has been reflected in the de-
velopment of the Fourteenth Amendment con-
fession rules and the McNabb-Mallory doctrine.
Both lines of cases have produced sharp disagree-
ment paralleling the controversy about the ex-
clusionary rule which bars unlawfully seized evi-
dence from criminal trials. Excluding a confession
obtained daring unlawful detention (or during pro-
longed questioning) and evidence obtained in a
unlawful search both involve a deliberate rejection
of evidence not shown. to be false and in many in-
stances shown independently to be reliable proof of
guilt. This is also true of a coerced confession which
under common law standards is inadmissible de-
spite independent corroboration. 3 The confession
rules and the rule on unlawfully seized evidence
are defended on the grounds that 1) they are the
only effective sanctions against violations of per-
sonal rights by law enforcement officials, and 2)
they protect the integrity of the judicial process
since the admission of such evidence would make
the courts participants in the process of obtaining
convictions by unlawful means. In both cases the
rule is attacked on the grounds that 1) it frees
guilty persons because of the misconduct of en-
forcement officials, 2) in practice, it does not result
in better police discipline and 3) it protects only a
small numbef of the victims of police misconduct
since the rule has no effect when such persons are
not charged with a crime or if charged plead guilty.
It is said that the exclusionary rules are ineffective
to stop abuses because an investigator may still
use improper methods in order to obtain leads to
other admissible evidence.
The arguments for and against the exclusionary
rules have been stated fully elsewhere 4 and will
92 NATIONAL CoMinssioN ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAwLEssNEss IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1931); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Personal Rights, 39 MiNN. L. REv. 493
(1955).
93 3 WIGmORE, EviDENcE, §§856-58 (3d ed. 1940).
91 See Memorandum on the Detention of Arrested
Persons and Their Production Before a Committing
Magistrate, prepared by some members of the Bill of
Rights Committee of the American Bar Association and
submitted May 15, 1944 to Sub-Committee No. 2
of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Represen-
tatives. This memorandum, apparently prepared by
Professor Chafee, is reprinted in the 1957 House Com-
mittee Hearings, the March 1958 Senate Committee
Hearings, at 69 A.B.A. REPORTS 274 (1944) and in
DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 483
(Chafee ed. 1951). See also Hogan and Snee, op. cit.
supra note 18; Barrett, Personal Rights, Property
Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, [1960] SUPREME
COURT REv. 46; 8 WIGisoRE, EVIDENCE, §§2183,
2184 (3d ed. 1940); Waite, Police Regulation by Rudes
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not be repeated here. But here too dependable in-
formation could assist discussion along fresh lines.
To what extent do the police use prohibited meth-
ods to obtain admissions which they know will not
be admissible but which they hope will lead to
other evidence? What is the effect of the exclusion-
ary rules, including the rule on coerced confessions,
in plea and sentence bargaining between the prose-
cution and defense? As stated earlier, it should be
possible to study the effects of the McNabb and
Mallory decisions on the methods of operation of
the FBI and the District of Columbia police, as well
as the effects of People v. Hamilton in Michigan. Is
it true that "the average police officer is not sensi-
tive to the decision of a court rejecting a defend-
ant's confession?"95 Taken literally, this statement
would apply to the use of force as well as interroga-
tion free of violence. On the other hand, there are
indications that the police are keenly aware of
judicial rules of exclusion and attempt to adjust
their investigating practices so as not to
hamper successful prosecution.96 The "average
police officer" may not be sensitive to the prob-
lems in this field, but the attitudes of his superiors
and the policies which they enforce count for much
more.
Information about the effects of the exclusionary
rules in practice will not resolve the issue. There is
no calculus to indicate at what point the com-
munity will insist that the rules be changed be-
cause of the number of apparently guilty persons
whom they set free. Nor is there any formula which
can demonstrate the success or failure of the ex-
clusionary rules in curbing police misconduct. But
factual information could temper extravagant pre-
dictions that the rules threaten a breakdown in law
enforcement.
V. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
THE POLICE STATION
Should an arrested person be entitled to counsel
before or during any interrogation by the police?
Perhaps the question is more properly put, should
arrested persons be denied the right to counsel
of Evidence, 42 Micr. L. REv. 679 (1944); and Inbau,
The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme
Court, 43 ILL. L. REv. 442 (1948).
95 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 94, at 461.
96 See the Mallory lectures given by the U. S. At-
torney's staff to the District of Columbia police, cited
note 60 supra. See also the testimony of William H.
Parker, Los Angeles Chief of Police, in the 1957 House
Committee Hearings at 71 et. seq., especially at 72 and 87.
prior to preliminary hearing? At issue are three
distinct questions, 1) whether the police should be
permitted to deny an arrested person's request to
communicate with a lawyer, 2) whether the police
should be under an affirmative duty to advise
arrested persons before questioning that they are
entitled to communicate with counsel at any time
and 3) whether the arrestee who does not know a
lawyer or have the money to employ one should be
assisted in finding counsel or furnished with coun-
sel at public expense before he is questioned.
The importance of counsel during the period be-
tween arrest and production of the prisoner in
court has been well stated and need not be re-
hearsed hereY The reasons for the right to counsel
during the later stages of criminal proceedings
apply with even greater force to the period during
which a potential defendant is in the custody of
police who have not yet accounted to a court. The
suspect may not know of his legal rights. Even if
he does, he probably needs professional advice to
correctly evaluate his position. Early intervention
by a lawyer can reduce the likelihood of abuses. He
can also reduce the impact of discrimination
against the poor and those who are less equipped
by experience or education to understand their
rights. As Professor Chafee said, "A person ac-
cused of crime needs a lawyer right after his arrest
probably more than at any other time." 0
Writing in 1955, a student of the right to counsel
observed, "Strangely enough, it is impossible to
say just when the right to counsel begins."" The
1958 decisions of the Supreme Court in Crooker v.
California00 and Cicenia v. LaGay'01 mark an im-
portant beginning in this field. In Crooker, a bare
majority of the Court rejected the broad argument
that the constitutional right to counsel should
apply generally during police interrogation pro-
ceedings. But the reasoning of the decision may
foreshadow a far-reaching development in the
direction urged by Crooker's counsel. The Court's
formulation of the constitutional rule has a broad
1
7 Allison, He Needs a Lawyer Now, 42 J. Am JuD.
Soc'y 113 (1958); Rothblatt & Rothblatt, The Right to
Counsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROoxLYN L.
Rv. 24 (1960).
98 Chafee Report, cited note 94 supra, at 47.99 BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN AmERICAN
CouxTs 127 (1955). There are a few exceptions. Some
state statutes make it a crime to prevent an arrested
person from communicating with a lawyer. CAL. PENAL
CoDE §825 (1959); ILL. REv. STATS. c. 38, §477 (1959);
Mo. STATS. ANvo. §544.170 (1953).
10 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
101357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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ring..... [S]tate refusal of a request to engage
counsel violates due process not only if the accused
is deprived of counsel at trial on the merits ... but
also if he is deprived of counsel for any part of the
pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so preju-
diced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial
with an absence of that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice.""' Crooker
Was undoubtedly adversely affected since counsel
might have strengthened his resolve not to answer
questions, shortened his interrogation by seeking
habeas corpus or explained rights which he may
not have understood. But the Court took a differ-
ent view. Crooker was not "prejudiced" since his
case was one of "a voluntary confession by a
college educated man with law school training who
knew of his right to keep silent." The rule of
Crooker appears to be that the defendant is preju-
diced by the denial of counsel if he does iot know
of his right not to answer police questions. The
companion case of Cicenia v. LaGay supports this
view. Justice Harlan's opinion in Cicenia is curi-
ously lacking in information about Cicenia such as
we aie given about Crooker. In substance, all that
the Court says about Cicenia is that he consulted a
lawyer before surrendering to the police and during
his questioning his requests to see his lawyer were
refused as were his lawyer's requests to see him.
As the Court of Appeals observed in Griffith v.
Rhay,1 3 Cicenia was presumably advised of his
rights since he had consulted counsel before sur-
rendering.
If this reading of Crooker is correct, then every
suspect in police custody who does not know of his
right not to answer police questions has the consti-
tutional right to talk to a lawyer before he can be
interrogated. The presumption against waiver of
the constitutional right can cast Crooker protection
around one who does not request counsel since
his failure to ask for a lawyer may buttress the
defendant's argument that he did not know his
rights.oI Paradoxically, the prisoner like Crooker
102 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958). Compare the Court's
statement three years earlier that due process is denied
by the assignment of counsel "at such time and under
such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective
aid in the preparation and trial of a capital case."
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955).
103 282 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1960) cert. denied, 5 L.ED.
2d 373 (1961).
0 This is not inconsistent with the statement in
Crooker that "coercion seems more likely to result from
the state denial of a specific request for opportunity
to engage counsel than it does from state failure to
appoint counsel immediately upon arrest." 357 U.S.
or Cicenia who requests counsel will be in a weaker
position to claim the right to counsel since it will
be easier to infer that he was sophisticated enough
to know of his right to silence.
This is the reading of Crooker adopted by the
Court of Appeals in Griffith v. Rhay. Griffith was a
murder suspect who was interrogated and con-
fessed while a hospital patient following serious
surgery and while under the influence of a narcotic
and analgesic drug. Although he was warned at the
outset of the questioning that anything he said
could be used against him, he was not told that he
did not have to answer, nor was he asked if he had
a lawyer or told that a lawyer could be provided if
he desired. He did not ask for a lawyer. The court
held that Griffith was prejudiced by the absence of
counsel since there was no indication that he knew
of his right to remain silent, counsel would un-
doubtedly have advised him of the right and, under
the circumstances, would probably have advised
him to remain silent. His failure to request counsel
was not treated as a waiver since there was no in-
dication that he knew of his right to counsel and,
even if he did, he was not in physical and mental
condition to intelligently waive the right. The use
of a confession based on admissions obtained
during his interrogation was held a violation of
constitutional due process.
The argument for excluding counsel from the
police station is simply that if the suspect talks to
a lawyer he will be advised not to answer any ques-
tions. This assumption is implicit in Justice Clark's
statement in Crooker that to "preclude police
questioning-fair as well as unfair-until the
accused was afforded opportunity to call his at-
torney" would have a "devastating effect on en-
forcement of criminal law."10 5 Similarly, in Cicenia
Justice Harlan said that to adopt the defendant's
position "would constrict state police activities in
a manner that in many instances might impair
their ability to solve difficult cases."'io6 The police
officials who testified at the 1944 and 1947 House
Committee hearings on the McNabb and Mallory
433, 438. That point is made in discussing the admis-
sibility of the confession.
Query, since the Crooker rule turns on whether the
defendant knows of his right to silence, can the police
safely exclude counsel by administering a caution?
If so, then the cases requiring that the right to counsel
be waived intelligently should put the burden on the
police to show more than a perfunctory warning. See
text at note 89, supra.205 357 U.S. 433 at 441.
10M 357 U.S. 504 at 509.
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cases said that an arrested person will generally
not answer any questions after he had been advised
by a lawyer or by the "tier lawyers" in a jail.'1
Justice Jackson said that any lawyer "worth his
salt" will tell his client to say nothing to the
police.'tm
It would be interesting to know how often and
in what type of cases lawyers do advise coopera-
tion and full disclosure. Since silence inevitably
invites suspicion, it is not unreasonable to suppose
that in many cases where the suspect is innocent
his lawyer will advise him to answer questions in
order to clear himself as quickly as possible and
assist the police. Moreover, the lawyer's advice
may be different if he is present at the interroga-
tion. It is one thing to dispense general advice to a
suspect from whose interrogation the lawyer will
be barred and quite a different matter to counsel
silence or answers to particular questions when the
lawyer hears them as they are asked.
But there seems no reason to doubt that counsel
will ordinarily advise silence where he learns that
his client is guilty or, although innocent, en-
dangered by compromising circumstances and
probably also when he lacks sufficient information
to form a considered judgment. 105 This would
make the work of the police more difficult. In-
troducing counsel into police station questioning
would have the practical effect of giving life to the
privilege of self-incrimination prior to the judicial
stage of criminal proceedings. From the police
point of view, it would have the effect of making
interrogation after arrest impossible in the very
cases in which it is most likely to help them find the
offender. The problem of counsel in the police
station thus brings us back to the initial question,
whether any pre-judicial interrogation by the
police should be allowed.
IN CONCLUSION: SHOULD ANY PRE-JUDICIAL
QUESTIONING OF ARRESTED PERSONS
BE ALLOWED?
The modern police function of preliminary
criminal investigation and interrogation of suspects
107 1943 House Committee Hearings, at 6, 1957 House
Committee Hearings, at 36.
108 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (con-
curring opinion).
109In Griffith v. Rhay, the Court of Appeals said
"In view of [the defendant's] physical condition, the
possible effect of the demerol, and the seriousness of
the charge and penalty, . . . an attorney would prob-
ably also have advised him to refuse to talk." 282 F.2d
711, 717.
is an unusual instance of discretionary adminis-
trative power over persons unregulated by judicial
standards. As Lord Justice Devlin has shown, it is
only in modern times that the police have in-
herited the responsibility for investigating crimes
and initiating prosecutions.110 In Britain, by the
early 19th century, this function had been suc-
cessively passed on by the grand jury and in turn
by the magistrates as the procedures of each be-
came judicial in character. Except for the British
Judges Rules and the law of confessions, the
English and American courts have not attempted
to define the interrogation powers of the police.
In large measure police station questioning in the
United States is governed only by the self-imposed
restraints of the police and by limited judicial
action in the small number of cases in which police
conduct becomes a litigated issue.
Whatever the reasons for their circumspection,
the failure of the courts to assume supervisory
powers over police interrogation practices remains
an anomaly. It is sometimes grounded on the
American separation of judicial and executive
powers. But this doctrine has not prevented the
courts from developing judicial standards for other
administrative agencies.
Measured by legal standards, the most unique
feature of police station questioning is its char-
acteristic secrecy. It is secrecy which creates the
risk of abuses, which by keeping the record in-
complete makes the rules about coercion vague
and difficult to apply, which inhibits the develop-
ment of clear rules to govern police interrogation
and which contributes to public distrust of the
police. Secrecy is not the same as the privacy which
interrogation specialists insist is necessary for
effective questioning. Inconspicuous recording
equipment or concealed observers would not de-
tract from the intimacy between the interrogator
and his subject which is said to increase the likeli-
hood of confession.
No other case comes to mind in which an ad-
ministrative official is permitted the broad dis-
cretionary power assumed by the police interroga-
tor, together with the power to prevent objective
recordation of the facts. The absence of a record
makes disputes inevitable about the conduct of
the police and, sometimes, about what the prisoner
has actually said. It is secrecy, not privacy, which
accounts for the absence of a reliable record of
interrogation proceedings in a police station. If
110 DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 86, c. 1.
[Vol. 52
POLICE INTERROGA TION PRIVILEGES AND LIMITATIONS
the need for some pre-judicial questioning is as-
sumed, privacy may be defended on grounds of
necessity; secrecy cannot be defended on this or
any other ground.
Secrecy should be prohibited. The method must
be comprehensive and complete. Many of the
various proposals to use sound recordings or mo-
tion picture cameras deal only with admissions
which the prosecution wishes to use in evidence?"
To be effective, the rule should require a record
from start to finish of any interrogation in a police
station sealed and certified by an independent ob-
server of the entire proceeding. The subject need
not be aware of the presence of the observer or the
recording equipment.
Problems come immediately to mind. Who
would the observers be and how would their con-
tinued independence be assured? Would the pres-
ence of observers in time become generally known
and make suspects aware that their interrogation
was being recorded? If this happened would the
frequency of confessions actually be reduced? Is
there a strange concern about the ethics of 'eaves-
dropping', even when the procedure is likely to
benefit the prisoner? Would the general require-
ment of a record eventually produce pressure for
further change in the direction of magisterial inter-
rogation? The questions seem difficult; however,
the interests involved are of sufficient importance
to justify the investment of considerable effort and
ingenuity to find solutions.
Once it becomes possible to speak factually
about police station interrogation proceedings,
three principal benefits may be anticipated. First
and foremost is the elimination of obvious abuses.
The problem of abuses is still a very real one.
Continued charges of prisoner mistreatment and
insistence on secrecy make it impossible to accept
police claims that the third degree is a thing of the
past. Moreover interrogation methods which
eschew violence may nevertheless involve other
abuses which are morally and psychologically
equivalent to physical force. The relationship be-
tween the interrogator and his prisoner inevitably
invites abuses not because policemen are any more
brutal than the rest of us but because the officer's
natural indignation at crimes of violence, his
position of relative sophistication and control over
the prisoner, the absence of disinterested observa-
tion and, above all, the frustration of suspended
" See e.g., 3 WIGooRE, EVIDENCE, §851a (3d ed.
1940), suppL. p. 102.
judgment all lead him to justify the use of means
which would be rejected if exposed to public
scrutiny." Professor Inbau finds ethically unob-
jectionable the use, when dealing with persons sus-
pected of crime, of less refined methods than are
appropriate for ordinary relationships among law-
abiding citizens. As an ethical principle, the limits
of this view are not immediately apparent.
Wigmore saw the problem very clearly when dis-
cussing the privilege against self incrimination:
"The exercise of the power to extract answers
begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of
that power. The simple and peaceful process
of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to
bullying and to physical force and torture. If
there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to
112 Consider the following views of one thoughtful
police official:
"Officers who have formed definite opinions as to
guilt or circumstances may innocently exert a strong
influence on the statements of witnesses whom they
interrogate. Furthermore, when investigators allow
theories of situations to form before there are suffi-
cient facts disclosed to support them, they are likely
to find their subsequent investigation restricted to a
search for facts to lend support to the ill-conceived
theory....
"Many hazards instantly appear when a criminal
investigation centers upon certain suspects because
of theories prematurely entertained. The most
troublesome of these hazards is that of premature
arrest. Arrests of this character are not made by
reason of a logical analysis of supporting facts, but
they occur by reason of the influence of the precon-
ceived theory, strengthened in part by other con-jectures such as the probability of the suspect
escaping the immediate jurisdiction, or as in many
instances, the hope that by severe grilling the suspect
may be brought to the point of putting his own neck
in the noose by confessing his crime. In every in-
stance of premature arrest it eventually becomes
apparent that there is not sufficient real evidence to
support a specific charge. This condition leads to
further compromising situations, and the effect of
the troublesome factors are forestalled or delayed
by resorting to other questionable practices, thus
setting off a chain of illegal action that may run
the gamut of condemned practices, from the filing
of unjustified vagrancy charges with exorbitant bail,
through incommunicado confinement to escape
the writ of habeas corpus; coercive grilling, in the
hope of securing a confession; third degreeing when
coercion fails; and even on up to actual 'framing,'
which has too frequently occurred.
"Policemen, in their eagerness to detect crime and
to apprehend and bring criminals to justice, are
inclined to overlook the importance of separation
of governmental function as a safeguard of personal
liberty. They are wont to usurp the prerogatives
of the judiciary in fixing the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and in eagerness to assert this pseudo
authority will resort to practices that are question-
able or highly irregular if not actually illegal."
KooKmN, Ernrcs iN PoLicE SERVICE 54, 55(1957).
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be a right to the expected answer, that is, to a
confession of guilt." 13
It is asking too much of the most disciplined of
men to grant virtually unlimited discretion to the
interrogator in such a situation without the
guidance and restraint of clear rules, disinterested
observation and eventual public scrutiny. The rules
against coercion and promises are manifestly in-
adequate for this purpose.
The second benefit which may be expected from
the elimination of secrecy in police station inter-
rogation is the clarification of the rules about
coercion and voluntariness. The very concept of
pressure is unsatisfyingly vague. With complete
records and a concrete understanding of what
police interrogation practices are actually like, the
courts will have a greater opportunity to clarify
the rules in general and agree about their applica-
tion in particular cases. The facts may also be help-
ful to the courts and legislatures in developing rules
to affirmatively define police interrogation powers.
Lord Justice Devlin recognizes that the breadth
of administrative discretion found in police in-
terrogation practices is inconsistent with the values
of a democratic society. He judiciously suggests
that the system works in large part because of the
average Englishman's confidence that his police
1138 WimoMRE, EvmENcE, §2251, at 309 (3d ed.
1940).
will behave fairly. The appointment, since he
wrote, of a Royal Commission to study the de-
teriorating relationship between the police and the
public may foreshadow some qualification in this
conclusion.114 In the United States, it is difficult to
discern the same degree of mutual confidence be-
tween police and public which our British cousins
have enjoyed. Eliminating secrecy in police station
questioning could go far to build public confidence
in the police, the kind of confidence to which the
police should be entitled and which in the long
run may prove a more powerful aid to effective
law enforcement than the most refined methods for
obtaining confessions.
Beyong the problem of secrecy is the ultimate
question, whether any pre-judicial interrogation
should be allowed. Such proceedings are irrecon-
cilable with the privilege against self-incrimination
and the right to counsel. Whether the police need
such powers in order to function effectively is a
matter of conjecture. Because such questioning
has become established practice, albeit without
legal sanction, any suggestion to abolish it and
completely judicialize the handling of arrested
persons will seem unrealistic. And yet, in the span
of history, it is only yesterday that official torture
was abolished. And we may yet see wider interest
in experiments aimed at increasing personal liberty
in the field of criminal law enforcement.
114 See references in note 88 supra.
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